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Human Research Subjects As Human Research Workers
Holly Fernandez Lynch
ABSTRACT:
Biomedical research involving human subjects has traditionally been treated
as a unique endeavor, presenting special risks and demanding special protections.
But in several ways, the regulatory scheme governing human subjects research is
counter-intuitively less protective than the labor and employment laws applicable
to many workers. This Article relies on analogical and legal reasoning to
demonstrate that this should not be the case; in a number of ways, human
research subjects ought to be fundamentally recast as human research workers.
Like other workers protected under worklaw, biomedical research subjects often
have interests that diverge from those in positions of control but little bargaining
power for change. Bearing these important similarities in mind, the question
becomes whether there is any good reason to treat subjects and protected workers
differently as a matter of law. With regard to unrestricted payment, eligibility for
a minimum wage, compensation for injury, and rights to engage in concerted
activity, the answer is no and human subjects regulations ought to be revised
accordingly.
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INTRODUCTION
In the early 1930s, a physician named William Osler Abbott was working to
develop a new technique for rapidly intubating the human intestine. He
swallowed the tubes himself until he "was sick of the sight of them" and worked
out some aspects of the technique using hospital patients. Eventually, however,
he realized the need to experiment on healthy human subjects.,
Abbott planned to offer two dollars a day to anyone willing to take the job,
and expected no difficulty recruiting at the height of the Depression. However,
relief administrators refused to refer anyone for this type of work. Abbott
lamented that "[i]n that day of poverty, destitution and collapsing homes, not one
solitary subject did I ever get through the very agencies that were apparently
striving to find jobs, to make jobs, to beg jobs of any kind for hungry men."
Abbott also failed to recruit "beggars," "tramps, vagrants, and the unemployed,"
all of whom recoiled at the work once it was described to them. Eventually, he
enlisted the help of a "black janitor on the hospital floor," offering a finder's fee
for every healthy subject brought in "appearing sober" and fasting, and finally
2had some success.
As he prepared to exhibit the intubation technique at a medical conference,
however, Abbott faced an unexpected problem: his subjects went on strike,
seeking more money. At the eleventh hour, he managed to recruit new volunteers
from a class of medical students, "a shipment of scab labor . . . that would have
made any factory foreman green with envy." Then, "the National Labor
Relations Board being as yet unborn," Abbott "had the pleasure of indulging in a
little old-fashioned capitalism. We fired the whole lot of [strikers], lock, stock
and barrel. The exhibit went off like clockwork."3 Thereafter, Abbott began
advertising in newspapers, which generated enough interest that he was able to
have his pick from among the applicants, most of whom volunteered for financial
4reasons.
Abbott's encounters are in many ways from a different time, but much of
what he describes could apply equally well to biomedical research involving
human subjects today: advertisements, payment for participation, and recruitment
based on physical characteristics and willingness to cooperate. One key feature,
however, stands in stark contrast. Abbott clearly viewed his subjects as workers
and their research participation as a type of job. But this view of the subject has
never taken hold. Today, researchers, ethicists, and regulators generally see
subjects as a class unto themselves - a class in need of special protection as a
1 W. Osler Abbott, The Problem of the Professional Guinea Pig, 68 TRANSACTIONS AM.
CLINICAL & CLIMATOLOGICAL Ass'N 1, 1 (1957).
2 Id. at 2-3.
3 Id. at 4.
4 Id. at 6-8.
125
4
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 14 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol14/iss1/3
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
result of a history of research scandal and other supposedly unique
characteristics, such as the nature of subjects' vulnerability, motivation, and risk
taking.
As a result, the protections offered to many traditional workers under U.S.
labor and employment law (hereinafter, "worklaw") have been treated as
completely separate from and exclusive of the regulatory scheme governing
clinical research. And although that regulatory scheme, and the thrust of research
ethics in general, is heavily focused on subject protection, some traditional
workers - usually those satisfying the legal definition of "employee" - receive a
number of legal protections that research subjects do not.
In recent years, however, the idea of extending worker-type legal protections
to human subjects has received some attention from bioethicists, and a few legal
decisions have even treated subjects as employees. In fact, while the subject
strike remains a novelty, the threat has been successfully leveraged at least once
since Abbott's time by healthy subjects in a drug metabolism study in
Philadelphia.
These developments raise a number of interesting questions: In what ways
are human subjects really like other workers? How are workers more protected
than subjects, and when do the rationales for various worklaws fit the context of
human subjects research (HSR)? Should human subjects be treated like
employees, independent contractors, or volunteers, or is a more nuanced
application of worker protections needed, if at all? Each of these questions is
addressed in what follows, but a number of prefatory statements are in order.
First, although the overarching discussion may be relevant to the entire realm
of HSR including social and behavioral research, primarily due to space
constraints, the focus here will be limited to biomedical research - and more
specifically, to clinical trials conducted in competent adult subjects.
In that context, this Article seeks to critically examine the way HSR is
currently regulated and to challenge the status quo approach that treats subjects
and workers as wholly distinct entities. Unlike much existing scholarship,6
however, it does not proceed by first identifying a variety of problems with the
HSR regulations and then searching for analogous models from clinical medicine
or elsewhere that potentially could be combined to do better; this is not an Article
about the inadequacies of institutional review boards, the problems associated
with poorly worded consent forms, or the inherent shortcomings of the HSR
regime. In fact, in this Article, the question is not about better versus worse,
adequate versus inadequate, good versus bad, but rather consistency versus
inconsistency. Thus, the Article starts with the premise that subjects and
protected workers are incredibly similar, and then uses that fundamental
similarity to identify problems with the existing HSR regulatory structure -
5 Robert P. Helms, Human Guinea Pigs "Band Together" and Win a Pay Hike, GUINEA PIG
ZERO (2003), http://www.guineapigzero.com/helmsstrike.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2013).
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aspects that are problematic by virtue of their inconsistency with the legal
treatment of protected workers, and that could be rendered less problematic
through a consistent approach. Thus, the scope of the question includes only
subjects and traditional workers, not subjects and every other conceivable
comparator.7
Using this particular type of analogical methodology, the Article advances a
simple argument: (1) Research subjects are, in relevant respects, like those
workers entitled to the protections offered by worklaw. In the clearest cases, they
are healthy, paid, and treat research participation as work. But even beyond that,
with the exception of true altruists, all types of clinical research subjects share
the key features that motivate worker protections, including interests that diverge
from those in positions of control, poor bargaining power, and collective action
problems. (2) Thus, the two groups should be treated alike unless there is some
good reason to behave otherwise. At present, however, they are treated
inconsistently and in both directions - subjects are simultaneously more and less
protected than traditional workers (note that I did not say "better" and "worse,"
as that is a distinct normative inquiry). The former scenario is largely tabled for
future work in order to permit sufficient attention to those circumstances in
which subjects currently find themselves less protected than their counterparts in
the working world. This is the more appropriate starting point given its contrast
against the intense drive for subject protection that motivates both the existing
legal and predominant ethical paradigms.
Of course, establishing a strong analogy between subjects and protected
workers is only one step in the analysis; analogy alone cannot resolve the
essential question of how to address inconsistent treatment between two similar
points of comparison. Thus, it is also necessary to determine which side of the
analogy should be destabilized in order to establish consistency - should we aim
to level subjects up to workers, granting them new baseline protections that run
alongside those they already have, or workers down to subjects, eliminating some
of their current baseline entitlements?
To that point, there is substantial scholarly and social disagreement as to the
value and importance of the minimum wage, workers' compensation, and union
activities, for example, and certainly some abuses. Opponents of these worklaw
protections maintain that they are blunt instruments for nuanced work
7 The worker comparison is chosen here primarily because it has been raised on numerous
occasions in the bioethics literature, but has received insufficient legal attention. See, e.g., Paul
McNeill, Paying People to Participate in Research: Why Not?, 11 BIOETHIcS 390 (1997);
Benjamin Sachs, The Exceptional Ethics of the Investigator-Subject Relationship, 35 J. MED. &
PHIL. 64 (2010); Marx W. Wartofsky, On Doing It for Money, in NAT'L COMM. FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, APPENDIX TO
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS (1976); and infra, Section II.A.
However, selecting this analogy is not meant to foreclose others, such as comparisons to patients,
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relationships and the variety of workplaces covered and that they unjustifiably
hinder the economy, such that we should instead leave everything to contract,
relegating the terms and conditions of work to the market. Similarly, some have
suggested a private ordering approach to certain aspects of HSR,5 allowing
competent adult subjects to contract with researchers and sponsors for the
benefits and protections they need to make research participation worthwhile.
However, for workers and subjects alike, there are reasons to be wary of a
purely market-based approach. As we will see, both lack information available to
the "opposing" party, both face substantial constraints on their bargaining power,
and both are susceptible to other problems recognized by behavioral economists,
such as weighting present interests more strongly than future interests and
otherwise failing to act in full accordance with the "rational actor." These
features also help to explain why, if subjects wanted or needed additional
protections, they have not already attained them. 9
Recognizing that this is a point of contention, this Article assumes (and I
believe) that we ought to be extremely hesitant to scale back the hard-fought
protections offered by worklaw and won over time by the labor movement.
Leveling workers down is inadvisable, whereas leveling subjects up is consistent
with the overall protective approach to HSR. To clarify the thesis, then, subjects
and workers are like cases and subjects ought to be treated more like protected
workers, unless the reasons for granting a particular type of worker protection
fail to apply to research subjects. And because this Article tables the issue of
whether subjects should retain those protections that are more extensive than
those available to traditional workers, the focus here is on changes that would be
additive to the status quo research regulations.
In setting forth this argument, the Article makes a number of unique
contributions. It is the first to offer a comprehensive legal analysis of this analogy
and the first to dig deeply into the question of why we protect workers the way
we do in order to determine whether those reasons are similarly applicable to the
subjects of biomedical research. It also offers new support for the argument
against research exceptionalism (i.e., the idea that research is special), and sets a
foundation for future applications of the worker analogy to determine the
protections that ought to be extended to organ donors, surrogate parents, and the
like.
With these broader goals in mind, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I
provides brief background on the current regulations governing HSR, and
identifies several reasons why these regulations evolved independent of worklaw.
Part II then describes and critiques existing bioethical and legal analyses of the
application of worker protections to subjects. Although these threads in the
8 See, e.g., Michelle N. Meyer, Regulating the Production of Knowledge: Research Risk-
Benefit Analysis and the Heterogeneity Problem, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 237 (2013).
9 Another important possibility is simply that the model of subjects as unique has become so
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literature provide an important starting point, they fail to adequately
acknowledge that workers are not a homogenous group, nor are they all entitled
to legal protection. Thus, Part II endeavors to fill that gap by considering the
different types of workers recognized by the law, the standards for distinguishing
between them, and the reasons those distinctions matter. It concludes that at least
some types of subjects, namely those who are healthy and paid to participate in
nontherapeutic research, can almost certainly be legal employees - the most
protected category - without changing a thing; this conclusion itself is an
important and novel contribution to the literature, since it is decidedly not how
subjects are treated at present.
However, Part III explains that simply treating subjects as employees would
be less than ideal, as it would incorporate existing problems from worklaw into
the research setting. Most importantly, the employee label currently fails to
capture all workers in need of legal protection, and would similarly fail to include
all subjects in need of worker protection. Thus, rather than analogizing to a
flawed status quo, Part III explores the fundamental reasons that certain types of
workers ought to be legally protected, many of which are sources of
vulnerabilities shared by a variety of research subjects. Finally, this Part argues
that even those subjects who do not closely resemble traditionally protected
workers (i.e., those subjects who volunteer altruistically, for therapeutic benefits,
or without pay) should nonetheless receive worker protections either because
they cannot be reliably distinguished from other subjects or because they face the
same relevant vulnerabilities.
From the starting point that workers should not be stripped of important
protections, Part IV considers the remaining options of leveling subjects up or
identifying relevant differences between the two groups. With regard to payment,
it concludes that the current implicit limits on subject compensation are
inappropriate and should be lifted, and that some subjects should be offered at
least a modified minimum wage but not unemployment compensation. It argues
that injured subjects should be guaranteed a no-fault remedy along the lines of
the worker compensation system, with some adjustments regarding the types of
injuries that will qualify. In contrast to regulation of the workplace, research site
conditions are best handled by application and enforcement of existing building
codes, facilities regulations, and the like. And although subjects are likely to face
some difficulty joining together for collective bargaining and alternative
approaches are likely to be more fruitful, they should be protected in their
concerted activities and any attempts at unionization.
Finally, Part V briefly responds to a few outstanding objections, emphasizing
the crucial point that protecting subjects like workers is not meant to encourage
"professional guinea-pigging," but rather to ensure that like cases are treated
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I. LEGAL AND ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HSR
There are many different types of human subjects research, and studies may
be risky or less so, biomedical or behavioral, early or later phase, government-
funded or private. There are also many different types of human subjects, who
may be paid or unpaid, healthy or sick, vulnerable or less so. Nonetheless, with
few exceptions,' 0 the regulations governing HSR do not differentiate on these
grounds. Instead, the regulations generally cast a wide and undifferentiated net,
protecting the many types of human subjects in the many types of research
studies in two primary ways.
First, they require that researchers obtain and document subjects' consent to
research participation under conditions that minimize the possibility of coercion
or undue influence and after a number of specific disclosures.12 Second, in order
for potential subjects to even be given the opportunity to participate, an
Institutional Review Board (IRB) comprised of disinterested scientific and
nonscientific members must first review and approve proposed research. More
specifically, IRBs cannot allow research to proceed unless risks to subjects will
be minimized and remaining risks are reasonable in relation to anticipated
benefits to subjects or society; subject selection will be equitable; informed
consent will be sought; data will be adequately monitored to ensure subject
safety; subject privacy and confidentiality will be protected; and there will be
sufficient protections for vulnerable groups.' 3 IRBs are the ultimate gatekeepers
in the world of HSR, authorized to approve, require changes to, reject, suspend,
or terminate research studies.14
This heavily protectionist approach to HSR is best understood in
historical context as a response to a number of ethical scandals and human rights
tragedies that have been well documented elsewhere, 5 such as the Nazi
experiments, Tuskegee syphilis study, and others. This helps to explain, at least
in part, why the HSR regulatory scheme has evolved separately from worklaw as
10 Note that there are some specific regulatory requirements for research involving pregnant
women, children, and prisoners. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R pt. 46, subparts B, C, D (2013); 21 C.F.R. pt.
50, subpart D (2013).
11 See 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' version of the
"Common Rule"); 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 312, 601, 812 (the relevant FDA regulations). The
Common Rule covers most federally funded HSR due to its adoption by a number of government
agencies. See Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES (HHS), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last
visited Nov. 21, 2013). Investigation of a product regulated by FDA will be subject to FDA's (very
similar) regulations, potentially in addition to the Common Rule.
12 45 C.F.R §§ 46.116-.117; 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20, 50.25, 50.27.
13 45 C.F.R. § 46.111; 21 C.F.R. § 56.111. In addition to initial review of research, IRBs must
also engage in continuing review at least annually. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e); 21 C.F.R. § 56.109(f).
14 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.109(a), 46.113; 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.109(a), 56.113.
15 See ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS (ACHRE), FINAL REPORT 98-
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a non-work regime: the Nazi victims and Tuskegee subjects hardly resembled
workers in the usual sense, but rather looked like victims of torture and patients
who had been subject to exploitation and neglect. Of course victims and workers
should be protected differently.
Another factor leading to this segregated approach is that the HSR
regulations were built on a predominantly medical model. Physicians were the
ones who "took the lead in drawing up rules of conduct for human subjects
research, and they were concerned to make the rules consistent with medical
ethics and comparatively unconcerned to create rules consistent with the rules we
apply in nonmedical contexts."l6 As a result, investigators - like practicing
physicians - have traditionally been expected to act protectively toward their
subjects' interests as a matter of professional responsibility,17 in contrast to the
often antagonistic relationship between management and labor. Moreover, the
clinical context in which biomedical research takes place also seems to create an
intuition that research participation cannot be work, such that worklaw
approaches would be inapposite.' 8
In reality, doctors engaged in research have fundamentally different goals
and responsibilities than doctors engaged in medical practice, but this distinction
has taken a long time to take root and remains somewhat controversial. 9 And
even if one accepts that distinction, there is no consensus that research
participation actually constitutes work, or that it should be treated as such.20
Ultimately, neither the victim model nor the clinical paradigm leaves much room
for a labor approach to HSR, from either legal or clinical perspectives.
As noted above, one obvious result of the fact that participation as a human
subject traditionally has been treated as outside the realm of worklaw is that
subjects are protected in a number of ways that workers, and others engaged in
16 Sachs, supra note 7, at 76.
17 See, e.g., Moral Science: Protecting Participants in Human Subjects Research,
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES (PCSBI) 9, 70-74 (Dec. 2011),
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%2OJune%202012.pdf [hereinafter Moral
Science] (recommending that human research protections be more explicitly understood as
professional standards).
18 On the other hand, the subjects of prison research, also of critical interest in the 1960s and
'70s when the foundation for the current regulations was laid, may have lent themselves more
favorably to a work-based regulatory regime, considering that they were often healthy, paid for
their participation, involved in commercial research, and in many cases signed waivers
acknowledging research risks. See Valerie H. Bonham & Jonathan D. Moreno, Research with
Captive Populations: Prisoners, Students, and Soldiers, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL
RESEARCH ETHICS 461, 465 (Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. eds., 2008). However, the unique nature of
their institutional confinement and restrictions on free choice weakened any resemblance to
traditional work.
19 See Howard Brody & Franklin G. Miller, The Clinician-Investigator: Unavoidable but
Manageable Tension, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 329 (2003); Sachs, supra note 7, at 76-77.
20 See McNeill, supra note 7, at 391.
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risky activities, are not. 2 1 Indeed, we do not have IRBs to approve which lawful
employment opportunities we may be offered, nor do the agencies responsible for
occupational health and safety and avoidance of employment discrimination
consider various factors that are part of IRBs' mandate, such as social value,
nonphysical risks, fair distribution of burdens and benefits, and the like.
Moreover, in most other realms of decision-making, we speak only of consent,
,,22which may often be implicit, not of explicit, written "informed consent. There
are a host of disclosures that must be made to employees regarding their rights
and certain types of workplace hazards, but these pale in comparison to the
requirements for research consent. 23 These and other examples of research
exceptionalism skewed toward heavy subject protection have received quite a bit
of attention in the literature, alongside more and less convincing arguments
regarding potential justifications, as well as calls for reform.2 4
The flip side, however, has received quite a bit less attention: to the extent
that the HSR regulations take a protectionist approach, and to the extent that
research subjects share important features with traditional workers, should the
protections extended to subjects really be less stringent than those provided by
worklaw? In many cases, the answer is no.
II. RESEARCH PARTICIPATION AS A JOB
A. The Bioethicists25
Although far from a movement, a few bioethicists have considered the
protections offered by worklaw as they search for ways to improve flaws they
26have identified in the existing human subjects regulatory regime. One line of
argument notes the potential benefits of a labor framework given the current state
21 Again, note that suggesting research subjects are more protected than others does not
necessarily correspond to a normative judgment as to whether they are better protected.
22 Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions:
Beyond Valid Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 80 (Franklin G. Miller
& Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).
23 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 500.75-.76 (2013) (describing disclosures that must be made to
migrant agricultural and seasonal day-haul workers); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2013) (OSHA's
Hazard Communication Standard). Some have argued for expanding the use of mandatory
disclosure in employment law. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace
Transparency, 63 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2011).
24 For example, Ben Sachs considers the ethical principles applicable to research subjects that
are not applicable to employees and volunteers, but not the legal differences per se. Sachs, supra
note 7. See also Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 22, at 79-105; James Wilson & David Hunter,
Research Exceptionalism, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 45, 48-49 (2010) (and the related open peer
commentaries in the American Journal ofBioethics, Vol. 10, No. 8 (Aug. 2010)).
25 Note that not all of the authors cited in this section would necessarily self-identify as
bioethicists. However, that title is used as shorthand to refer to arguments that have been made
outside of the legal sphere.
26 Ari VanderWalde & Seth Kurzban, Paying Human Subjects in Research: Where Are We,
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of paid participation by healthy subjects, while another emphasizes the
discrepancy between the treatment of subjects and other wage-earners, and
considers the implications of a unified approach, without necessarily endorsing it.
However, a number of critical questions remain.
1. Healthy Subjects and Avoiding Exploitation
One reason to adopt a labor approach for HSR is the simple fact that as a
result of payment, at least some subjects view research participation as a job,27
and even those who do not may sometimes reasonably be viewed as selling their
bodily services for money, just like other laborers.
In addition to reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs, subjects of all types
may be given additional payment, characterized as compensation for time and
28
inconvenience, an enrollment incentive, or even just a token of appreciation.
However, whereas patient-subjects in a potentially therapeutic trial spanning the
course of two years might receive between $25-50 per monthly visit, healthy
subjects in a phase I drug study lasting a few weeks might receive $200-400 per
day.29
The difference can be explained by the fact that for healthy subjects in
nontherapeutic research, the risks and burdens of participation are not
compensated by the prospect of direct medical benefit or even contribution to an
area of personal relevance. Thus, substantial payments are often essential to
adequate recruitment. 30 However, it is worth noting that while research
participation as a healthy subject may be unpleasant, it is not usually as risky as
the general public perceives it to be. 1 Subjects are closely monitored and serious
adverse drug reactions are rare. Nonetheless, they do occur, certain types of
27 ROBERTO ABADIE, THE PROFESSIONAL GUINEA PIG: BIG PHARMA AND THE RISKY WORLD OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 2, 78 (2010); GUINEA PIG ZERO: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE JOURNAL FOR
HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS 5-6 (Robert Helms ed., 2002); Matthew Weinstein, A Public Culture
For Guinea Pigs: US Human Research Subjects After the Tuskegee Study, 10 SCIENCE AS CULTURE
195, 204 (2001); Nancy Ondrusek, Making Participation Work: A Grounded Theory Describing
Participation in Phase I Drug Trials from the Perspective of a Healthy Subject 78-80, 178 (2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto) (on file with author).
28 See Terrence F. Ackerman, An Ethical Framework for the Practice of Paying Research
Subjects, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., July-Aug. 1989, at 1, 2; Ruth W. Grant & Jeremy Sugarman,
Ethics in Human Subjects Research: Do Incentives Matter?, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 717, 719-23 (2004)
(distinguishing between different types of payments).
29 ABADIE, supra note 27, at 5, 13, 22-23, 93, 121. For more on subject payment rates, see
Neal Dickert & Christine Grady, Incentives for Research Participants, in THE OXFORD TEXTBOOK
OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS, supra note 18, at 386, 394; Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 10.
30 Carl Elliott, Guinea-Pigging, NEW YORKER Jan. 7, 2008,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/07/080107fa fact elliott.
31 ABADIE, supra note 27, at 75; Trudo Lemmens & Carl Elliott, Guinea Pigs on the Payroll:
The Ethics of Paying Research Subjects, 7 ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 3, 13 (1999); David B. Resnick,
Compensation for Research-Related Injuries, 27 J. LEG. MED. 263, 265 (2006).
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drugs may be riskier than others,32 and monitoring for the duration of a study will
not catch any problems that manifest later.33 Unfortunately, there is little
empirical data on the overall safety of participation as a healthy research
subject.34
As one might expect, like workers, many healthy subjects are motivated to
participate in nontherapeutic clinical research primarily by economic factors,
even if other reasons also play a secondary role.35 The money offered can be
lucrative for relatively short spurts of commitment, leading some healthy subjects
to become repeat players, 36 although it is unclear precisely how large this subset
is. In fact, both the numerator and denominator are relative unknowns because
there are several barriers to developing accurate estimates of how many healthy
subjects are enrolled in research overall, and how much of the demand for the
healthy subjects is met by those who have participated before. There is no
national registry of trial subjects, although some sites have developed local
registries to address the problem of overlapping enrollment. For example, a
group of five sites in Florida found that over the course of 18 weeks in 2009-
2010, 2081 individuals attempted to enroll in 27 Phase I studies, 2.4% (50) of
whom attempted to enroll in another study within 30 days of receiving a dose in a
previous study, and an additional 8.9% (186) attempted to enroll again within 60
days.37 Local registries obviously provide only a limited snapshot, however, and
can be circumvented; 38 the Florida cohort did not include two large research sites
in the area. Thus, U.S. and worldwide numbers remain elusive, but the Florida
data alone indicate that the overall number of healthy subjects is not trivial, and
that the subset of repeat subjects is also substantial. In fact, there exists a small
32 Roberto Abadie, The Professional Guinea Pig, BioEDGE (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://www.bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/bioethics-article/9204/.
33 ABADIE, supra note 27, at 7-8, 82-83.
34 Adil E. Shamoo & David B. Resnick, Strategies to Minimize Risks and Exploitation in
Phase One Trials on Healthy Subjects, 6 AM. J. BIOETHICS, at WI, W4-W5 (2006).
35 Leanne Stunkel & Christine Grady, More than the Money: A Review of the Literature
Examining Healthy Volunteer Motivations, 32 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS 342 (2011); see also
ABADIE, supra note 27, at 5, 41; Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 178-79; Olivia Katrandjian, Growing
Number of Mothers Participating in Clinical Trials to Make Ends Meet, ABC NEWS (Nov. 21,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/growing-number-mothers-participating-clinical-trials-make-
ends/story?id=14999849. For a description of the type of people who typically become healthy
research subjects, see ABADIE, supra note 27, at 32; GUINEA PIG ZERO, supra note 27, at 212-214;
Sheldon Zink, Maybe We Should Pay Them More, I AM. J. BIOETHICS 88, 88 (2001); Elliott, supra
note 30.
36 See ABADIE, supra note 27, at 66; Shamoo & Resnick, supra note 34, at W3; Ondrusek,
supra note 27, at 5.
37 Darran Boyar & Norman M. Goldfarb, Preventing Overlapping Enrollment in Clinical
Studies, J. CLINICAL RES. BEST PRACTICES 2 (Apr. 2010),
http://firstclinical.com/journal/2010/1004 ClinRSVP.pdf; see also Giovan Maria Zanini & Claudio
Marone, A New Job: Research Volunteer?, 135 SwIss MED. WKLY. 315, 315-317 (2005) (reporting
similar results from a Swiss register of healthy subjects).
38 David B. Resnick & Greg Koski, A National Registry for Healthy Volunteers in Phase 1
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community of individuals who view themselves as "professional guinea pigs,"
some of whom have been able to turn participation into their livelihood.40
The increasing commercialization of clinical research over the past several
decades, particularly at the early phases,4' combined with the motivations,
perspectives, and behaviors of healthy participants in nontherapeutic research has
led some to call for regulatory changes that would more accurately reflect this
current state of affairs. Trudo Lemmens and Carl Elliott, for example, are
troubled by the failure of regulatory and ethical guidelines to recognize that a
great deal of research involving healthy subjects is essentially a business
transaction. They argue that even though everyone knows better, "researchers
have to pretend that [healthy] subjects are motivated by something other than
money.[4 2] Research subjects cannot negotiate payment, since payment is not
supposed to be the focus of the transaction. Local research ethics boards are
expected not to determine what is fair, but what is 'undue inducement"' per the
regulations.43 The result is that healthy subjects face exploitation due to being
essentially prohibited "from receiving a fair wage and denie[d] . . . the legal
resources available to other high risk workers."44 In particular, healthy subjects
"get none of the rights or benefits that come with a good job, such as workers'
compensation, the right to unionize, disability benefits, or health insurance".45
Reasoning that healthy and patient subjects have different interests,
vulnerabilities, and motivations for participating, Lemmens and Elliott maintain
that it is a mistake not to distinguish between them.46 They suggest that a labor
39 See, e.g., ABADIE, supra note 27; GUINEA PIG ZERO, supra note 27; Helms, supra note 5;
Ondrusek, supra note 27. Note also that the "professional" subject in existence today is a far cry
from the ideal form suggested by Maureen Rist and William J. Mohan in Wanted: Professional
Research Subjects; Rewards Commensurate with Risks, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28 (1976).
40 Elliott, supra note 30. Some subjects rely on research for a substantial proportion of their
income, while others use the money as a needed supplement to cover bills or provide extra cash.
See ABADIE, supra note 27, at 5, 32, 42; Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 72-75, 106, 172.
41 Richard Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, 19 HEALTH AFF. 129 (2000);
Miriam Shuchman, Commercializing Clinical Trials - Risks and Benefits of the CRO Boom, 357
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1365 (2007); Elliott, supra note 30.
42 However, federal regulators are beginning to soften on the hard line they have historically
drawn regarding financial motives for participating in research. See, e.g., Office of Human
Research Protections (OHRP), Informed Consent: Frequently Asked Questions, HHS (Mar. 2011),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/consentfaqsmar2O11.pdf [hereinafter OHRP, Informed Consent]
(noting in response to Question 7 that "compensation may be an acceptable motive for agreeing to
participate in research").
43 Trudo Lemmens & Carl Elliott, Justice for the Professional Guinea Pig, I AM. J.
BIOETHICS 51, 52 (2001).
44 Id. at 53.
45 Carl Elliott & Roberto Abadie, Exploiting a Research Underclass in Phase I Clinical
Trials, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2316, 2317 (2008).
46 Savulescu also takes issue with the payment structure of clinical research, but without
distinguishing between healthy and patient subjects. Instead, he distinguishes between commercial
and noncommercial research, arguing that subjects should be offered "fair compensation and
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model is more appropriate for paid healthy subjects research, which takes place in
a commercial sphere where the research institution and subject enter the
relationship on financial grounds in the absence of shared interests. 47 Indeed, they
suggest that "the regulatory regime and protective measures offered by many
labor and occupational health and safety laws may provide a very useful model
for the protection of subjects" in a number of ways:
For example, labor-type legislation could empower
occupational health and safety agencies to conduct inspections,
and it could lead to the establishment of occupational health and
safety committees in which subjects are represented . . . .
Collective negotiations and unionization would be a way of
empowering subjects and of giving them a stronger voice in
arguing for good working conditions. As with workers'
compensation, appropriate compensation schemes could be
enforced to offer some form of financial security in case subjects
are harmed in research. Standards of remuneration could be
negotiated, based on the level of discomfort, the number and
types of procedures, the duration of the studies, particular
circumstances such as the obligation to remain in the research
institution for a lengthy period of time, and so on. Regulation
could also require . . . that research subjects have disability
insurance and other insurance coverage to protect them in cases
of "occupational injury." 48
Lemmens and Elliott claim that action is needed on these fronts, since
research participation is not considered "employment" at present, leaving
subjects ineligible for the resources and protection provided by existing
worklaws. 49 However, they are careful to clarify that their linkage between
healthy subjects research and labor contracts is not intended to be literal,
emphasizing that "research has particular characteristics which warrant treating it
as a category sui generis".s0 They also raise some additional concerns suggesting
that they do not fully buy into the analogy, not all of which are convincing. For
example, they worry about the risk of further commercializing healthy subjects
research, exacerbating the risk of exploitation if restrictions on payment are
salary" when they participate in a project intended to bring in profit. Julian Savulescu, On the
Commercial Exploitation ofParticipants ofResearch, 23 J. MED. ETHICS 392 (1997).
47 Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31, at 4-5, 14-16. Many authors have argued for differential
treatment of healthy subjects and patient subjects. See Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 43, at 52; Ari
VanderWalde, Undue Inducement: The Only Objection to Payment, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 25, 26-27
(2005); Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 197.
48 Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31, at 16-17.
49 Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 43, at 52.
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removed without adding other protections (particularly for safety), and
potentially hindering important research that cannot afford to pay subjects a
competitive price.5 ' Several of these issues are taken up in Part IV.A.
Other bioethicists have taken a similar stance with regard to advocating for
certain employment-type protections of healthy Phase I research subjects, but
have gone even further. For example, Adil Shamoo and David Resnick also argue
against payment limits for healthy subjects,5 2 and suggest that these subjects,
"like all workers," should receive compensation for injury and be permitted to
use collective bargaining to negotiate for higher pay and better working
conditions. Unlike Lemmens and Elliott, however, Shamoo and Resnick seem to
have no reservations regarding the wholesale adoption of a labor approach to
healthy subjects research. The same is true of Roberto Abadie, who rather than
drawing a mere analogy to work, suggests that in order to avoid unacceptable
exploitation we "need to recognize that [healthy] volunteers' participation is
labor, even if it is what they call a 'weird type of work,' and provide better
working conditions and proper compensation." "Paid subjects," he maintains,
"should be given the same labor protections guaranteed to other workers in risky
occupations." 54
2. Equating Subject Payment with a Wage
Exploration of work-type protections for HSR has also been prompted by a
different starting point, a widely discussed proposal by Neal Dickert and
Christine Grady to treat payment to research subjects as a wage. Recognizing that
paid participation raises a variety of ethical concerns, but also that payment is
common, probably necessary in some cases, and currently without adequate
regulatory guidance, Dickert and Grady set forth three models on which payment
to healthy and patient-subjects could conceivably be based. 5 After rejecting both
a market model, in which supply and demand for subjects dictate how much they
are paid, and a reimbursement model, in which payment is limited to either
reimbursement of a subject's actual expenditures or his time away from work,
Dickert and Grady ultimately endorse a wage-payment model on the basis that
research participation is analogous to other essential but unskilled labor, and
should be paid on a commensurate scale. While recognizing some drawbacks,
they favor this as the best option because it would reduce the possibility that
subjects will be unduly induced to participate against their better judgment, as
51 Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 43, at 52-53; see also Neal Dickert & Christine Grady,
What's the Price of a Research Subject? Approaches to Payment for Research Participation, 341
NEw ENG. J. MED. 198, 199-201 (1999) (rejecting the market model).
52 Shamoo & Resnick, supra note 34, at W9-W 11 (2006); see also VanderWalde, supra note
47, at 27.
53 ABADIE, supra note 27, at 165-66 (emphasis added).
54 Id.
55 Dickert & Grady, supra note 51, at 198.
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well as reduce the financial sacrifice required of subjects, while allowing them to
be paid for work that is valuable to society. In addition, this approach would set a
lower limit on the amount paid with all the associated benefits of a minimum
wage, and the standardization of pay across studies would result in less
competition for subjects between them.56
Despite this conclusion, however, Dickert and Grady did not suggest that a
labor approach to research is appropriate across the board. James Anderson and
Charles Weijer, on the other hand, have considered the moral implications of
treating subjects as wage-earners or entrepreneurs on a broader scale.57 They note
that if participation is a job for which one may be paid, morally indistinguishable
from other lines of legitimate employment, then similar cases must be treated
similarly, and the ethics of research participation must be viewed through the
same moral lens used to determine just working conditions in other contexts.
Anderson and Weijer suggest that management's obligations to workers vary
depending on whether the workers are part-time or full-time, temporary or
"career," and that these distinctions are mirrored among human subjects, who
may be characterized as either "occasional" or "professional."60 They go on to
explore the potential features of just working conditions, including those
minimum protections set by law, as well as additional normative requirements
such as the right to meaningful work and the fair distribution of "hard work."'
Anderson and Weijer recognize that each of these rights does not necessarily
apply to all workers, but rather depends on their level of dependency,
commitment, and investment.
Thus, like both temporary and career workers do, both
occasional and professional subjects have a right to at least a
62minimum wage. Both are protected by standard work week
legislation and have a right to overtime pay for hours outside of
that standard. Both have a right to a safe workplace, and no fault
compensation for work related injury. And both have the right to
organize into unions. Similarly, professional subjects, like career
workers, [also] have a right to a pension, to benefits such as
56 Id. at 199-201.
57 James A. Anderson & Charles Weijer, The Research Subject as Entrepreneur, I AM. J.
BIOETHICs 67 (2001) [hereinafter Anderson & Weijer, Entrepreneur]; James A. Anderson &
Charles Weijer, The Research Subject as Wage Earner, 23 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 359
(2002) [hereinafter Anderson & Weijer, Wage Earner].
58 Anderson & Weijer, Wage Earner, supra note 57, at 360.
59 Charles Weijer, Meaningful Work as Due Inducement, 26 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS
431-32 (2005).
60 Anderson & Weijer, Wage Earner, supra note 57, at 361-62.
61 Id. at 364-70.
62 Id. at 375. Anderson and Weijer appropriately take issue with Dickert and Grady's
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medical and dental insurance, and finally, they have the right to
meaningful work.63
Of course, at present, subjects are not treated this way, but rather "many of
the deplorable working conditions characteristic of the industrial revolution are
being duplicated in the realm of biomedical research."6
This disparity is problematic and unjust, Anderson and Weijer maintain, if
subjects are workers too.65 Thus, we must either adjust present practice or reject
the idea of paid subjects as unskilled wage-earners.66 They do not explicitly state
which approach they favor, although they do suggest some discomfort with
treating research subjects like other workers and indicate that the morally
satisfactory solution to the issue of subjects-for-hire requires something more
than improved working conditions or unionization. 67 Others, however, maintain
that "paid research subjects must have the same rights, benefits, and payment
schemes available to all workers of similar type." 68
3. Analysis
Although the bioethics literature considering the analogy between human
subjects and more traditional workers has certainly moved the ball forward, the
arguments remain incomplete. This is understandable given that the existing
literature begins from a different starting point, using the analogy to identify
solutions to imperfect subject protections, whereas this Article is more interested
in the analogy for its own sake to identify inconsistencies in need of resolution.
So what work remains?
First, while there has been some attempt to differentiate between different
types of subjects and recognition of the fact that different types of workers
generally get different rights and benefits, the distinctions that have been drawn
by references to high-risk work, "good" jobs, and temporary versus career work
do not necessarily map onto the lines drawn by the law, which predominantly
distinguishes between independent contractors and employees. Many have
criticized these legal lines and how they are drawn, as described below, but the
fact remains that there are entire categories of workers who stand without the
protections under discussion for subjects. The case has not yet been adequately
made as to why subjects are distinguishable from independent contractors, who
do not receive these protections, and analogous to employees, who do.
63 Id. at 371.
64 Id. at 372.
65 Anderson & Weijer, Entrepreneur, supra note 57, at 68.
66 Anderson & Weijer, Wage Earner, supra note 57, at 374.
67 Anderson & Weijer, Entrepreneur, supra note 57, at 68; Weijer, supra note 59, at 432.
68 VanderWalde & Kurzban, supra note 26, at 555.
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Another aspect of the debate that is far from resolved is whether human
subjects actually engage in work. A number of potentially relevant criteria have
been raised to date, including payment, and more specifically payment as a wage
or something else;69 subject motivation and source of vulnerability;7 0 acting
versus being acted upon;71 commodification of the body itself compared to sale
of a service; 72 risk and uncertainty as key features of the activity or mere
byproducts;73 and the perceptions of relevant players. 74 Resolution of this
question in favor of participation as work would certainly strengthen the
argument regarding subject protection, at least as a matter of consistency.
However, given the philosophical complexity of accurately defining work, and
because the argument regarding subject protection can also be made on the basis
of analogy and shared goals and challenges, rather than on a definitional basis,
the ontological question will not be further considered here.75
But note that some have even rejected the very analogy that would compare
research participation to work, or have at least questioned the analogy's
application. For example, when commissioned for comment on the issue by the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, philosopher Marx Wartofsky argued that what is being sold
by the research subject is different than what is being sold by the worker in a
hazardous occupation; "[t]he coal miner is paid to mine coal," he claimed, but the
subject is "paid to put himself at risk in order to see what the effects will be on
his body or his health." 76 This distinction fails, however, because in both cases
individuals are intentionally exposed to the risk of harm in order to achieve some
other goal. More simply, the subject could just as easily be seen as paid to
provide data - the primary purpose of HSR - as to accept risk, rendering risk a
byproduct rather than a defining feature of research.
On the other hand, for certain types of research, such as challenge studies
involving intentional exposure to infection and drug safety studies in healthy
subjects, and for many types of research procedures done exclusively to gather
research data, the primary goal of generating generalizable knowledge can only
be achieved through the means of intentionally inflicting harm, rather than
merely foreseeing it as a side effect. This is different from nearly every other
69 See, e.g., Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31; Anderson & Weijer, Wage Earner, supra note
57; Grant & Sugarman, supra note 28.
70 See, e.g., Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31, at 14-15; Shamoo & Resnick, supra note 34.
71 See, e.g., Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31; Wartofsky, supra note 7.
72 See, e.g., Dickert & Grady, supra note 51; Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31, at 16;
Wartofsky; supra note 7.
73 See, e.g., Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31, at 16; Wartofsky, supra note 7.
74 See, e.g., Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 31.
75 1 do hope to address it in future scholarship, however. For now, suffice it to say that if
prostitution and modeling can be considered work, participation as a human research subject can be
as well. See GREGOR GALL, SEX WORKER UNION ORGANISING: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY, 23-34
(2006).
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type of risky work in which harm may be foreseen, but is neither intended nor
useful toward any goal, and in fact, hopefully avoided. 77 This distinction may be
important with regard to justifying the special extra protections that are extended
to research subjects, such as IRB review and informed consent. However, it
certainly does not suggest that subjects should have fewer protections than
workers or that it is inherently problematic or offensive to analogize between the
two.
Nonetheless, Paul McNeill also maintains that risky work is a poor analogy
to HSR, arguing that dangerous work "must be justified by some greater need"
and "every effort should be taken to minimize the risks inherent in the work."78
Although this is precisely what is required of HSR, and in fact not required in
practice or by law for many types of work (such as crab fishing or diamond
mining), McNeill questions whether research actually needs to be done at all,
since progress is an "optional goal" and the "justification for research is always
in terms of progress." 7 9 However, if dangerous work such as fire fighting is
necessary, which McNeill concedes, why is dangerous work such as research
participation - which may also save lives and meet basic human needs - any less
so? There seems to be no reason to distinguish between different types of
potentially preventable deaths when people have voluntarily put themselves at
risk in the service of a greater good. Terrence Ackerman also tries to distinguish
research from risky work, arguing that the "roles performed by police officers,
fire fighters, and soldiers are absolutely essential to the welfare of society. . . . By
contrast, conduct of clinical research involving serious dangers to the welfare of
subjects (which they would otherwise avoid) is generally not necessary to
achieve the goals of medical research.,s If serious dangers to subject welfare in
any particular study were not actually necessary to the research, however, IRBs
would by regulation be required not permit them. Thus, Ackerman's distinction
fails as well.
There may in fact be some real differences between at least certain types of
research participation and traditional work, but none of these differences suggest
that worklaw protections would be inappropriate in the research context, and the
analogy is strong enough on its face to sustain serious comparative analysis. The
bioethicists who have put the analogy forth to date, however, have not adequately
considered the goals and rationales of worklaw and whether they overlap with
those of human subjects protection. This is primarily because the bioethicists
have identified some problematic aspects of the existing human subjects
protection regime and seek lessons from other areas as to how things could be
improved. In that context, all one needs to know is whether worklaw approaches
77 Thank you to Collin O'Neil for pointing out this distinction.
78 McNeill, supra note 7, at 392.
79 Id.
80 Ackerman, supra note 28, at 4.
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would in fact offer such improvement. But again, the problem motivating this
Article is not some concern that the HSR regulations are inadequate, but rather
concern that the HSR regulations are inconsistent. And for that type of analysis, a
deeper understanding of why certain workers are protected in certain ways is
essential to demonstrating that such inconsistency ought to be resolved.
B. Legal Background
Before getting to the question of "why," however, we must address some
foundational questions regarding the type of worker most appropriate for
comparison to human subjects.
1. Employees and Employers
Whether at the federal, state, or local level, the laws that regulate working
relationships generally cover employees only, as opposed to independent
contractors or volunteers.8 ' Thus, non-employees are usually ineligible for wage
and hour protections, unemployment benefits, workers' compensation, family
and medical leave, protected rights to form or join a union and collectively
bargain, anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation protections, and workplace safety
protections, for example. But who counts as an employee?
Worklaw statutes themselves often contain a number of specific inclusions
and exclusions that help clarify whether a given worker can claim coverage. With
regard to the definition of employee itself, however, statutory language is
notoriously tautological. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
covers "employees," but defines the term as "an employee of an employer who is
employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce," and an
"employer" as a "person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has
employees . ."82 Similar circularity is found in the National Labor Relations
Act, and a number of other federal and state laws.84 As a result, courts and
administrative agencies have had to develop a number of tests for distinguishing
employees from other types of workers.
One way to defeat employee status is to find that the work in question is
beyond the economic or market sphere, such as that done in the home or by
prisoners.85 Another is to determine that the worker is a volunteer because he
81 Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How
It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 366 (2001); Noah D. Zatz, Working
Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE
STANDARDS AT THE BoTFoM OF AMERICA'S LABOR MARKET 31, 34 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds.,
2008).
82 29 U.S.C. § 652(5)-(6) (2006).
83 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3) (2006).
84 Carlson, supra note 81, at 296, n.5.
85 Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic
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receives - and expects to receive - no financial compensation or benefits in
return for his work. The receipt of certain benefits may push a worker out of
volunteer territory, 87 but mere reimbursement of expenses incurred incidental to
the work is likely insufficient to do so.
Employee status also may be defeated by demonstrating that a worker is an
independent contractor, but unfortunately, there is substantial uncertainty and
disagreement regarding exactly how and when to make this distinction. The
precise rules and definitions provided in statutes, regulations, and judicial
opinions are usually both complex and vague.8 8 Courts have relied on a number
of different approaches, including the common law "direct and control test"
(which asks whether the hiring party retains the right to direct and control "not
only what shall be done, but how it shall be done");89 the "economic realities
test" (which examines the whole activity of the relationship to determine the
extent of the hiring party's domination over the worker and the worker's
economic dependence); 90 and the "statutory purpose test" (which defines
employees "in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained" by
the law in question). 9' A great deal has been written about the similarities and
differences between each of these approaches, 92 and certain tests have been
adopted over others in the context of interpreting particular statutes. The
important thing, however, is that in nearly every jurisdiction and for nearly every
worklaw, the relevant test of employee status involves an intricate weighing of a
laundry list of case-specific factors, which often point - or can be manipulated -
in different directions.9 3 As a result, these tests, which apply precisely as a result
of statutory ambiguity, are often ambiguous themselves, leaving substantial room
for unpredictability, confusion, and differences of opinion about the status of
86 Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147,154 (2006).
87 Id. at 157; Zatz, supra note 85, at 920 n.293.
88 Zatz, supra note 81, at 35.
89 Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 523 (1889); see also Carlson, supra note 81, at
304-306, 309-11; Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment
Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 251, 280 (2006); Zatz, supra note 81, at 35.
90 Carlson, supra note 81, at 311-13, 314, 317, 327, 342; Stone, supra note 89, at 280; Zatz,
supra note 81, at 35.
91 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst, 322 U.S. Ill, 124 (1944) (quoting South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v.
Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940)). For a discussion of the current status of the statutory purpose
test, compare Carlson, supra note 81, at 333, 338, 343, 353 and Zatz, supra note 81, at 35
(suggesting that the test is essentially dead as a matter of determining federal statutory coverage),
with Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Michael D. Ray, The Definition of "Employee" in American
Labor and Employment Law, JAPAN INST. LAB. POL'Y & TRAINING 124,
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/events andinformation/documents/clls04 dauschmidt2.pdf (last
visited Nov. 21, 2013) (indicating that in most areas of worklaw, status as an employee is defined
according to the purposes of the statute).
92 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 81, at 309-44.
93 Id at 343.
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workers who seem to fall somewhere between employee and independent
contractor (or volunteer). 94
It is also important to recognize that there is a second component to
determining a worker's employment status: identifying which party, if any, will
ultimately be responsible for providing the benefits or protections afforded to
employees under various laws. On the upside, the law recognizes joint
employment relationships in which a single employee can simultaneously have
multiple employers for the purposes of particular work. However, there is also a
growing phenomenon of "employerless employees" 96 and "disintegrating
employers."97 When there are multiple parties involved, the features of an
employment relationship that usually hang together may be split up.9 8 As a result,
each of the putative employers can plausibly deny employer status on the
grounds that none individu'ally satisfies the relevant legal criteria. Thus, a worker
who does not really control his own work without dependence on any other party
may be left without any employer from whom he could demand benefits.
2. The Employment Status ofHuman Research Subjects
Some of the shortcomings of worklaw categories and tests are apparent even
from consideration of the limited instances in which the status of human subjects
has been given direct legal attention. For example, in one of the more interesting
opinions issued to date, an unemployment board of appeals relied on the
intervention of a contract research organization (CRO) between the company
seeking data and subjects participating in drug absorption trials to find that the
subjects seeking benefits were independent sub-contractors, rather than
employees. 99 Importantly, CROs, which can take on any or all of a sponsor's
regulatory obligations, and perform services ranging from recruitment to actually
running trials in their own dedicated facilities, are increasingly being utilized to
carry out clinical studies quickly and efficiently,o00 rendering subjects'
employment status even more precarious.
The state unemployment law in question defined workers as independent
contractors ineligible for coverage when they satisfied a three-pronged test,'0
94 Stephen D. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 167 (2003);
Carlson, supra note 81, at 301, 335-53.
95 Zatz, supra note 81, at 41.
96 See generally Stone, supra note 89.
97 Zatz, supra note 81, at 37.
98 Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of
Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 661, 688-91 (1996).
99 Board of Appeals Decision, [Md.] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 8469 (Nov. 14, 1994), 1994
WL 16865552.
100 Phillip Mirowski & Robert Van Horn, The Contract Research Organization and the
Commercialization ofScientific Research, 35 Soc. STUD. Sci. 503, 509-13 (2005).
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which the Board determined to be met here. First, the Board held that none of the
control exerted by the CRO, Pharmakinetics, over the subjects was adequate to
create an employer-employee relationship. The Board explained that when a
general contractor hires a sub-contractor, the sub-contractor is not entirely
unrestricted in his work, but rather must follow the set of plans established by the
customer. Because these restrictions are imposed by the customer, however, they
do not constitute an employer's control by the general contractor, even when he
takes steps to ensure they are met.102 In the research context, then, the Board
construed the drug company as the customer, the research protocol as the
customer's plans, Pharmakinetics as the general contractor, and the subject as the
sub-contractor.103 It also suggested that because after the subject ingests the drug,
"it is his/her body which is actually performing the work," the general contractor
cannot "logically" have control over the performance of the subject's work and
can rather only monitor for proper administration.10
With regard to the second prong, customary engagement in the independent
performance of the work involved, the Board maintained that the subjects were
"engaged in the business of providing drug testing services," and emphasized that
they may be involved in multiple studies for multiple companies.105 Third and
finally, the Board had to decide whether the subjects' work was outside the usual
course of Pharmakinetics' business, which it determined to be analyzing data on
drug absorption and providing results to companies; "[t]esting drugs is merely
the part of their business in which they derive their data."106 On the other hand, it
found that the work of the subjects is to test the drugs - to ingest them and
provide bodily fluids for analysis. 107 The subjects' work was clearly integral to
Pharmakinetics' business, but the Board held it was nonetheless outside its scope,
arguing that just as Pharmakinetics needs subjects, "the presence of a
subcontractor plumber is needed and necessary in the course of business of
his/her general contractor."o
108
Although it emphasized the general contractor/sub-contractor analogy, it is
noteworthy that at least the second and third prongs of the Board's (questionable)
analysis would similarly apply had a drug company engaged the subjects for a
test they were running themselves without the aid of a CRO. Nonetheless, the
Board's analogy between a protocol and a customer's plans seems flawed. Plans
may specify certain standards and aspects of process, but they would not specify
precise details of how the work must be done, focusing attention instead on the
end result. Clinical trial protocols, on the other hand, are of course concerned
102 Board of Appeals Decision, supra note 99, at 3.
103 Id. Note, however, that this case might have reasonably been decided as an example of
joint employment.
104 Id. at 4.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 4-5.
108 Id. at 5.
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with the end result - the data - but are also enormously detailed with regard to
schedules, procedures, and other restrictions, all features strongly indicative of an
employer's type of control. Ultimately, the Board tried to draw a distinction
between managing the integrity of the work (customer/contractor) and
controlling its performance (employer/employee). 09 However, the two are really
one and the same in the clinical trials context.
In contrast to the Pharmakinetics decision, consider Edward Lowe Industries,
Inc. v. Missouri Division of Employment Security,"0 which reached a different
conclusion on a quasi-subject's employment status for purposes of
unemployment benefits. Lowe engaged the services of paid consumer panelists,
including the claimant Zeta Simms, to conduct studies evaluating the odor of
different cat litter formulations."' The court considered the factors set forth by
the IRS to flesh out the common law control test, and determined that on the
totality of the circumstances, Simms was in fact an employee. 12 However, the
state unemployment law explicitly stated that "the term 'employment' shall not
include . . . [s]ervices performed as a volunteer research subject who is paid on a
per study basis for scientific, medical or drug related testing . . . .""' This
particular statutory carve out of certain types of research subjects as non-
employees is an interesting indication of policy choice regarding which
individuals ought to receive unemployment protection, but in this case, the court
concluded that Simms' services did not fall within the exclusion on the grounds
that the litter tests were clearly not medical or drug related, nor were they
particularly scientific.'14
Notably, the I.R.S. has applied its factors directly to human subjects as well,
reaching the same conclusion on employment status as the court in Lowe. 115
Other legal decision makers have also determined that subjects can be
employees. For example, when Qualia Clinical Services declared bankruptcy,
research subjects who had not been paid as promised filed claims under a priority
wage provision of the Bankruptcy Code. In response to Qualia's challenge, the
court held that entitlement to priority wage claims could extend even to
individuals who are not employees depending on whether "something more than
a 'mere contractual relationship' existed between the parties, as well as on the
109 Id. at 3.
110 865 S.W.2d 855, 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
111 Id. at 858-59.
112 Id. at 860-63.
113 Id. at 863 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.034(12)(17) (West 1993) (current version at
§ 288.034(12)(18) (West 2013)). Other states have nearly identical provisions. See, e.g., MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8-222 (West 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-604(6)(s) (2011).
114 865 S.W.2d at 863.
115 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-34-024 (Aug. 21, 1992) (determining that a paid subject
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amount of control exercised over the claimants by the debtor."' 16 Because
subjects had signed consent forms that were lengthy and detailed, the study
protocols required rigid control, studies were conducted at Qualia's site, and the
subjects were overseen by Qualia staff, the court determined that the "extent of
Qualia's control over the claimants' performance in the studies effectively
rendered them 'employees."" 7 Qualia's role as a CRO seems to have played no
part in the analysis.
Research subjects have also claimed employee status in the context of sexual
harassment and minimum wage/overtime claims, although it is unclear whether
they would have been successful because their cases settled out of court." 8
Further, the Comptroller General has weighed in on this question, at least
tangentially. In 1966, the Army sought to use civilians as human subjects in its
experiments, secured under contracts on a fee basis." 9 However, a government
rule allowed such contracts only if the service would be performed without
detailed control over the method by which the desired result would be
accomplished.12 0 The Army explained that this condition was satisfied because it
was "not interested so much in what the subject produces through his efforts, as
in measuring and examining the subject's reactions to a set of conditions induced
by the government. The government exercises no control over the subject's
reactions in the sense of directing the subject how to react, and in fact the
experimentation is valid only if his reactions are purely independent and
objective."' 21 The Comptroller was convinced that the situation did not "clearly
fall within the rules for establishing an employee-employer relationship," 22 and
saw no objection to treating the subjects as independent contractors without
entitlement to leave, retirement, salary, tenure, etc.123
116 In re Qualia Clinical Servs., Inc., No. BK09-80629-TJM, 2009 WL 2513820, at I (Bankr.
D. Neb. Aug. 11, 2009).
117 Id. at 2.
118 Email from Scott Magaw, attorney for the plaintiffs (Feb. 12, 2012)(on file with author).
The cases in question were Krah v. Univ. of Pitt., No. 2:97-cv-00834-DEZ (W.D. Pa. 1997), and
Cortazzo v. Univ. of Pitt., No. 2:97-cv-00832-DEZ (W.D. Pa. 1997). See also Hank Grezlak,
Research Participants Sue for Sexual Harassment, PENN. L. WKLY., May 5, 1997; Doc Watch:
Lady Lab Rats Sue Researcher, 4 GUINEA PIG ZERO 27 (article on file with author).
119 To the Sec'y of the Army, 45 Comp. Gen. 649, 649 (1966).
120 Id. at 650.
121 Id. at 649.
122 Id. at 650.
123 Id. at 650-51; see also SEC'Y OF THE AIR FORCE, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION No. 40-402 (May 5, 2005)
(noting that private individuals participating as research subjects may enter into an independent
contractor relationship with the Air Force).
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Beyond this handful of scattered examples, however, which present
arguments and outcomes on both sides of the line, there is virtually no discussion
of subjects' employment status in the legal literature.124
3. Analysis
The cases considering the employment status of human research subjects
present a very small n, which is further limited by the fact that none of the cases
seems to have involved unpaid research participation, therapeutic research, or
patient-subjects, nor does any address issues likely to be of importance to
subjects such as workers' compensation. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw a few
broad conclusions.
First, despite the unique (or at least unusual) nature of the workers in
question, all of the cases involved rigid application of the relevant law, without
real consideration of statutory purpose, whether the subjects actually needed the
protection they sought, fairness, or possible consequences. This sort of strict,
formalist approach is the norm in worklaw,' 2 5 but stands in stark contrast to the
policy focus of the bioethicists described above.
Second, these examples indicate that at least some types of human subjects
are likely to have little difficulty with the preliminary hurdles of establishing
their employee status, namely the performance of work and existence of an
economic relationship. Indeed, with the exception of Pharmakinetics' point
regarding the subject's body doing the work, none of the decision makers in these
cases stumbled over these questions, instead simply assuming the subjects were
engaged in market work and focusing exclusively on distinctions between
employees and independent contractors. This is notable considering that the
prevailing approach in bioethics and research compliance is to treat human
subjects as though they are not engaged in work at all.
Finally, these cases suggest that legal avenues of subject protection beyond
the current HSR regulations may have been under-pursued to date. That is to say,
contrary to Lemmens and Elliott's point that human subjects are not considered
employees, at least some legal decision makers have been willing to recognize
them as such. Thus, it seems plausible that certain types of subjects seeking
additional protections could conceivably achieve them even under existing law,
depending on the language of the statute in question, any specific exemptions or
124 For two examples of pieces that very briefly consider whether the exclusion of women
from research participation could constitute illegal employment discrimination, see R. Alta Charo,
Protecting Us to Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical Research Trials, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J.
135, 156 (1993); Vanessa Merton, The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable
People (a.k.a. Women) from Biomedical Research, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 307, 358 n.193, 369
(1994).
125 See Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: "Employee" as a
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inclusions, and interpretation of each element in the relevant test of employment,
as well as the particular details of how the research is carried out.
There is room for disagreement, but the strongest case for employee status
seems to exist for paid subjects in nontherapeutic research who are motivated by
money, ideally in the absence of a potentially complicating CRO. Those engaged
in therapeutic research may have more difficulty establishing the market nature
of their work, although this would not necessarily be insurmountable. And the
weakest case exists for those who expect to receive nothing in return for their
participation in research, since they are clearly volunteers under the law. For
reasons that will be explored in the next Part, however, this sort of purely
doctrinal approach leaves much to be desired.
III. CLARIFYING THE ANALOGY AND ITS SCOPE
Legal analysis indicates that the "human research worker" analogy might be
closer to reality for some subjects, namely those likely to fit the bill as
employees. However, this does not necessarily mean that direct application of
existing worklaw is the best approach. Nor does it mean that the analogy fails for
other types of subjects, or that they should not also be granted additional
protections based on those available to workers. Rather than trying to map
different types of subjects directly onto the legal standards for employees,
independent contractors, and volunteers, it is preferable to think carefully about
precisely which protections to incorporate into the HSR regulations, and how
they should be refined for that context
A. Why Not Apply Worklaw Directly to Subjects?
A number of features of worklaw suggest that it is best used only as a model
for HSR, rather than a perfect fit. Most critically, many have suggested that
existing laws and interpretations are ill-suited to the modem work environment -
and if they are in need of modification on their home turf, there is compelling
reason to worry about their application to HSR.
Part of the problem is anachronistic in the sense that the
employee/independent contractor distinction that is now used to allocate
responsibility for a variety of worker benefits and protections was originally
developed from the master/servant doctrine of agency law for an entirely
different purpose: allocating responsibility for a worker's tortious conduct. As
often happens when applying rules from one situation to another, marginal cases
can become difficult to handle. Moreover, as Katherine Stone explains,
[t]he legal rules governing collective bargaining and
individual employment rights, as well as the provision of social
welfare benefits all assumed the existence of a stable, on-going
relationship between an individual and a firm. Now, as firms are
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breaking apart, downsizing, rearranging their functions, and
dispersing their facilities, they no longer offer the kind of stable
long-term relationship upon which our legal rules depend. 126
Importantly, these concerns are rooted in features of changing working
relationships that are inherent in HSR, such as temporary engagement and work
for several different parties. In fact, one feature of the modem workplace that has
been cited as a challenge to existing legal frameworks - outsourcingl 27 - has an
obvious corollary in the conduct of medical research: CROs. And just as
traditional workers can problematically be left unprotected as employerless
employees, when the components of research are disaggregated across a number
of parties in a variety of combinations, the question of who is controlling the
subject becomes substantially more complicated.
Those critical of the current state of worklaw do not necessarily take issue
with the fact that not all workers are covered.128 But the problem for many
commentators is that the lines drawn can result in workers who seem to need
protection being left without it.129 As a result, some have advocated for
completely discarding the labeling distinctions between different types of
workers, 130 and instead simply examining whether a particular worker needs
protection. 3 1 Others have suggested experimenting with legal approaches that do
not rely so heavily on employer-employee relationships as the source of worker
protection;132 recognizing new intermediate labels, such as the "dependent
contractor" and "uncontrolled employee"; 133 simply changing the basic
definitions of employment to better encompass those workers sharing the
characteristics that justify protection; 134 and paying closer attention to whether
entitlements that have been tied to the existence of an employment relationship
really ought to be. 35
The point here is not to fully engage with the criticisms of current legal
approaches, but rather to note their existence and plausibility, which suggest
serious concerns about the protections available to workers in general. If we
126 Stone, supra note 89, at 254.
127 Id. at 253-56; Zatz, supra note 85, at 860-61; Zatz, supra note 81, at 43.
128 Davidov, supra note 125, at 2.
129 Befort, supra note 94, at 168; Carlson, supra note 81, at 367; Stone, supra note 89, at 256-
270, 279; Dau-Schmidt & Ray, supra note 91, at 117, 120.
130 But see Davidov, supra note 125 (arguing against this approach).
131 Carlson, supra note 81, at 301; Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in
Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness,
21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 187 (1999); Stone, supra note 89, at 284.
132 Zatz, supra note 81, at 32, 57.
133 Befort, supra note 94, at 172-74; Guy Davidov, Who is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57, 61-
62 (2005); see also Linder, supra note 131; Stone, supra note 89, at 279.
134 Zatz, supra note 81, at 51; Davidov, supra note 125, at 9, I1.
135 ALAIN SUPIOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR
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really believe that human subjects should receive some worker-type protections,
applying existing worklaw might paradoxically fail, or at least not reach all the
right subjects.
B. Shared Concerns of Subjects and Protected Workers
Because the prevailing legal tests for distinguishing between different types
of workers fail to generate results that correspond reliably and precisely to those
who really ought to be protected - and would likely do the same for subjects
given critical questions regarding who is in control and the temporary nature of
research relationships - it is necessary to look beyond these tests in both
contexts. But if we acknowledge that "there are some workers ('employees') . . .
that are in need of protection, while at the same time there are others who are
capable of protecting themselves in a market environment [and] . . . in the case of
employees there is a corresponding employer who can and should take
responsibility for their well-being,"136 it is insufficient to simply argue, as the
bioethicists have, that research subjects are like workers and should be treated as
such. Instead, it is necessary to demonstrate that they are more like those workers
who should be protected than like those who will do fine on their own.
Leaving articulation of the perfect dividing line between protected and
unprotected workers to the worklaw scholars, it seems that subjects often share
not only the basic features of workers in general - at least some are engaged in
commercial transactions, are paid to provide a service, and view what they do as
a job - but also the very same features of workers who are unable to protect
themselves and therefore deemed to need legal intervention. For example, they
have divergent interests from those in positions of control, highly unequal
bargaining power, strong potential for exploitation, democratic deficits,
dependence, and limited alternatives. Moreover, there exists a party that can
reasonably be expected to take responsibility for subjects' well-being: research
sponsors. Even if sponsors are not necessarily seeking to profit from the research,
and even though the burdens placed on subjects may be justifiable in light of the
ends pursued, there is nothing unfair about expecting sponsors to protect the
subjects used to achieve the sponsor's goal - or at least nothing less fair than
expecting employers to protect their employees even when the work done has
some socially valuable purpose and benefits that accrue to others.
1. Divergent Interests
Both workers and subjects have interests that often diverge from the interests
of those in control, although this is not to say that there is no overlap. Employees
and employers may share the goal of profitability, and subjects and researchers
may share the mutual goal of safety. However, managers will generally extend
136 Davidov, supra note 125, at 13; see also Carlson, supra note 81, at 356.
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only those benefits necessary to attract and retain an acceptable workforce, which
is precisely why the law must sometimes intervene.
Similarly, subjects and researchers or sponsors may not necessarily be overt
antagonists, but they are not always on the same side of the line. For example,
more amenities offered at a Phase I research facility, higher payment to subjects,
more safety tests, and the like will all lead to a more expensive trial, leaving less
profit for the drug company or CRO - or perhaps of greater concern, less money
available for other research. Other examples abound. Including greater detail in a
consent form might help shield an institution from lawsuits or liability,137 but
make it more difficult for the average subject to understand.'3 8 Sponsors have
little incentive to investigate or track latent effects of trial participation, although
that may be important to subjects' long-term health. And even the most
upstanding researcher is (or should be) focused on the population-level benefits
of increased scientific knowledge;13 9 in order to obtain that knowledge, subjects
are inherently asked to do things that may run against their own physical
interests, such as undergo tests needed only to generate data rather than to
improve their care. Thus, like employees and employers, subjects and those
doing the research are in many cases after different things. This is true regardless
of whether the subjects are healthy or patients, paid or unpaid, or in therapeutic
or nontherapeutic studies.
2. Bargaining Power, Collective Action, and Exploitation
In some cases, workers and subjects may also share the plight of poor
bargaining power and collective action problems. As a matter of simple supply
and demand, when there is a surplus of workers willing to do a job, competition
between them can create a race to the bottom. Addressing this problem is another
reason worklaw often intervenes in the market.140
137 See Michelle M. Mello, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The Rise of Litigation
in Human Subjects Research, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 40 (2003).
138 See Nancy E. Kass et al., Length and Complexity of US and International HIV Consent
Forms from Federal HIV Network Trials, 26 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1324 (2011) (demonstrating
consent forms to be long and in excess of recommendations for how much information can be
readily processed). But see Leanne Stunkel et al., Comprehension and Informed Consent: Assessing
the Effect of a Short Consent Form, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., July-Aug. 2010, at I (finding that
comprehension was generally poor and that "neither comprehension of study information nor
satisfaction with the consent process was affected by either the length or the complexity of the
consent form").
139 Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: Therapeutic
Misconception in the Ethics of Clinical Trials, 33 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 19, 21 (2003).
140 Davidov, supra note 125, at 5 ("It is often said that the basic characteristic of an
employment relationship - which is also the background reason for all protective labour and
employment regulations - is the inequality of bargaining power between the individual employer
and the individual employee."). However, Davidov contends that inequality of bargaining power is
not necessarily helpful in determining which class of workers should be entitled to "employee"
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Similarly, in the research context, there is often competition to get into
studies, either for therapeutic or financial reasons.141 When subjects are
replaceable, and particularly when their alternatives are limited, they may be
unwilling to risk exclusion in order to negotiate for better terms, individually or
collectively. 142 Once a study has begun, subjects are in a better position
considering the sunken investment in their data,143 but even then, loss of a single
subject is a relatively surmountable obstacle for those conducting the research.
The real concern would be losing all the subjects, and thus all the data, and
having to start from scratch. However, that requires collective action, which may
be difficult to muster.
The ultimate concern raised by unequal bargaining power is that subjects and
workers may find themselves in circumstances of mutually advantageous
consensual exploitation. In other words, they will benefit enough to make
participation worth their while, but it will nonetheless be unfair if they deserve
more given the burdens they are undertaking or the value of their work.'" The
baseline entitlements and protections of worklaw help to address the possibility
of such exploitation for workers, but many important entitlements are lacking for
HSR.
3. Democratic Deficits, Dependency, and the Need for Protection
Finally, research subjects may face the two fundamental problems that
worklaw scholar Guy Davidov identifies as justifying the extension of worker
protections: "democratic deficits" and economic dependency.145 He defines
democratic deficits to mean subordination to or control by another, and economic
dependency in terms of one's ability to spread economic risks among a number
of different relationships.146 Thus, dependency is determined by the exclusivity of
the arrangement, the proportion of income derived from a particular hiring party,
and the duration of the engagement. 147
It seems clear that subjects often meet the subordination criterion, but
dependency may be more difficult, particularly given Davidov's narrow
understanding of the term. First, some subjects may not be economically
dependent on research participation at all; they may not even be paid. But they
may nonetheless be dependent on a trial for other benefits, such as access to
141 Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 85; Abadie, supra note 32.
142 Elliott & Abadie, supra note 45, at 2317; Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 43, at 52;
VanderWalde, supra note 47, at 26-27; Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 121.
143 ABADIE, supra note 27, at 57-58.
144 Elliott & Abadie, supra note 45, at 2317; Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation in Clinical
Research, in EXPLOITATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE ETHICS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 63-
104 (Jennifer S. Hawkins & Ezekiel J. Emanuel eds., 2008).
145 Davidov, supra note 133, at 63.
146 Id. at 61-63.
147 Id. at 67-68.
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certain types of medical interventions unavailable elsewhere. Second, paid
subjects may not be dependent on any particular trial, but rather on participation
in trials in general. Similarly, a worker may have several jobs and thus be better
able to withstand the loss of any one of them, while being relatively powerless in
all of them because her alternatives are no better and may be worse. This creates
a certain type of dependency that is admittedly broader than that articulated by
Davidov, but nonetheless seems relevant.148
In a perfectly competitive market, there are enough other workers, enough
other jobs, enough information, and few enough barriers that the parties will
reach an ideal agreement; there is no need for legal intervention. Of course, this
is often not the case,14 9 and Davidov acknowledges that the presence or absence
of asymmetric vulnerability is an important difference when it comes to
allocating legal protection between different types of workers.150 However, he
maintains that a focus on unequal bargaining power is problematic for
determining the proper application of worklaw protections because it is an
empirical question and, more importantly, because some degree of inequality
almost always exists in any market. Thus, Davidov proposes the dependency
criterion as an alternative that may be more readily discernable,' 5 ' while still
noting a link between the concepts: "dependency points to inequality of
bargaining power; to the ineffectiveness of both voice and exit as means to
protect one's self." 5 2 And research subjects may have problems with both.
Ultimately, a feature they often share with other workers who are and should be
granted worklaw protections is lack of access to better alternatives.
C. Weaker Analogy, Same Protections
Thus, many subjects are like those workers to whom the law does and/or
ought to extend protection, but this is not true across the board. Should this mean
that only some subjects ought to be granted analogous new rights? Not
necessarily.
First, consider subjects motivated purely by altruism, who resemble
volunteer workers to whom worklaw protections usually do not extend.153
Without the pull of either therapeutic or financial need, these subjects have
adequate bargaining power to protect their own interests; if they do not like the
terms offered by a study, they can easily walk or hold out for better. Thus, it
would be appropriate to refrain from extending worker protections to altruistic
subjects, not because they do not deserve them, but because they can achieve
these terms on their own.
148 Stone, supra note 89, at 284.
149 Davidov, supra note 125, at 6.
150 Id. at 8.
151 Id.
152 Davidov, supra note 133, at 67.
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But how could we practically segregate these subjects from others to whom
worker protections should be extended? A rule excluding unpaid subjects would
not suffice, although it would mirror the legal rule applicable to volunteers, since
subjects might still be motivated by therapeutic benefits and therefore less able to
bargain effectively on their own behalf.154 A rule excluding unpaid subjects in
nontherapeutic research also would not work to tease out the pure altruists
because subjects might nonetheless be motivated by therapeutic benefits in light
of the therapeutic misconception, 55 or perhaps strong feelings of obligation to
their doctors, treating institution, or others with their same ailment. Perhaps the
best rule would be to exclude unpaid, healthy subjects in nontherapeutic research,
although even they may be motivated by something other than altruism, such as
free medical care or other nonmonetary benefits. Moreover, altruistic subjects
may be paid, they are just not (primarily) motivated by that fact. Ultimately,
altruistic subjects do not need worker protections, but it is likely better to be
over-inclusive here, since extending worker protections to altruists would simply
grant them at least what they would demand in order to be willing to participate
in the first instance, whereas excluding them could potentially sweep up some
subjects who really are in need.156
On the other hand, some subjects who would benefit from the extension of
worker protections and could not effectively bargain for them actually seem
different from protected workers in important ways. For example, unpaid
subjects lack a defining characteristic of the protected worker: payment for labor.
And subjects in therapeutic research may be paid, but also differ from protected
workers in that the benefits they predominantly anticipate are completely outside
the commercial context. Thus, it is not quite right to suggest that these subjects
ought to be treated just like protected workers because they are just like protected
workers. They are not. Nevertheless, payment to workers is not itself what
renders them in need of protection; instead, it is dependence on that payment,
which in turn reduces their bargaining power. Subjects - paid or not, seeking
noncommercial benefits or not - can be similarly dependent, with similar
outcomes.
Clearly, the law does not intervene every time there is a disparity in
bargaining power, but it often does. Moreover, it specifically protects weak
workers, albeit imprecisely, from a number of problems that also threaten weak
subjects. And perhaps most importantly, the government is far from hands off in
the research context. For decades, subjects have been viewed as in need of
stringent regulatory protection, and intrusion in the relationship between
154 Note that a similar problem arises when volunteers actually need the volunteer
opportunity for some other purpose, such as college credit for an internship, which impedes on their
ability to bargain and exit. See, e.g., id. at 151.
155 Paul S. Appelbaum & Charles W. Lidz, The Therapeutic Misconception, in THE OXFORD
TEXTBOOK OF CLINICAL RESEARCH ETHICS, supra note 18, at 633-44.
156 See Davidov, supra note 125, at 11.
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researcher and subject is commonplace, as exemplified by the regulatory
requirements for IRB review and approval, specific standards for acceptable
consent, control over subject recruitment and compensation, and the like. Against
this background, it seems that subjects should be at least as well protected as
workers when they face similar problems, even when the analogy is imperfect.
IV. LEVELING SUBJECTS UP TO WORKERS
When groups that are the same in relevant respects face uneven treatment,
consistency demands that the unevenness be remedied, which can occur either by
leveling up or leveling down. For example, in those cases where workers are
more protected than subjects - our focus here - the difference could be
eliminated by granting subjects those same protections or stripping those
protections from workers. However, considering that workers really seem to need
the protections they are granted, the latter option of leveling down would be
unwarranted and inappropriate. Moreover, considering that we have far more
experience with regulation of the workplace than with regulation of human
subjects research, and because many more people are traditional workers than are
research subjects, existing worklaw protections are likely to be a better reflection
of social norms and agreement than the absence of those protections in the
research setting.157 Thus, the remaining options are: (1) to level subjects up for
parity with the legal status quo applicable to workers, while acknowledging that
workers (and therefore subjects) should sometimes be even more protected than
they currently are, or (2) to identify some relevant distinction justifying a
particular difference in treatment. What follows will consider which of these
approaches is warranted for some of the most pressing and obvious disparities
between the two groups.
A. Payment
One of the most highlighted differences between research participation and
employment - indeed, the one that got Lemmens and Elliott going - is the
disparity in how payment is regulated in either case. The HSR regulations permit
subject payment, but include no minimum wage requirement. They also impose
no maximum, but the general regulatory requirement to protect consenting
subjects from undue inducement in practice acts as a variable payment ceiling.
Moreover, although technically silent on the matter of whether payment to
157 Sachs, supra note 7, at 75.
158 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2013); 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2013); OHRP, Informed Consent, supra
note 42; OHRP, Institutional Review Board Guidebook: Chapter III, HHS § G (1993),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irbchapter3.htm [hereinafter OHRP, IRB Guidebook]
(section on "incentives for participation"); see also Emily A. Largent et al., Money, Coercion, and
Undue Inducement: Attitudes about Payments to Research Participants, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES.,
Jan.-Feb. 2012, at I (finding that IRB members are very concerned that subject payments will lead
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subjects may be based on risk, the regulations' direction to avoid undue
inducement is often taken to mean that risk-based payment is impermissible.159
Federal regulators have recently made an effort to clarify that remuneration to
subjects may indeed include compensation for risks, and that compensation may
be treated as an acceptable motive for subjects agreeing to participate in research.
However, IRBs are nonetheless cautioned that such remuneration should not be
treated as offsetting research risks in the analysis that boards themselves are
required to undertake before approving research proposals. And still, IRBs are
warned to ensure that "payments are not so high that they create an 'undue
influence' or offer undue inducement that could compromise a prospective
subject's examination and evaluation of the risks or affect the voluntariness of his
or her choices." 160 Ultimately, the concern is that the offer of high payment may
be so irresistible to subjects that it will lead them to exercise poor judgment in
accepting unnecessary, unreasonable, and excessive risks of serious harm, i.e.,
risks that a reasonable person would not assume. 161
Whether undue inducement ought to be a relevant consideration in the
research context is a matter of significant debate,162 but what is clear is that fear
of undue inducement plays no role whatsoever in the legal regulation of wages
paid to workers. In fact, worklaw imposes no ceiling - explicit or implicit - on
how much workers may be paid, although other factors may. And in theory, the
market should dictate (and some laws do)163 that risky work be better
compensated, a phenomenon called the compensating wage differential.'
Further, even when risky jobs are held by those with few other options for less
risky work that is comparably compensated, the law does not require that their
payment be restricted on that basis.' 6 5 Worklaw does, however, impose a
compensation floor in some cases. Workers meeting the Fair Labor Standards
Act's definition of nonexempt employee are entitled to be paid the federal
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour (since 2009), and at least one and a half times
159 See Sachs, supra note 7, at 70.
160 OHRP, Informed Consent, supra note 42.
161 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Undue Inducement: Nonsense on Stilts?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 9
(2005); OHRP, IRB Guidebook supra note 158; see also Dickert & Grady, supra note 29, at 390
(providing a somewhat different definition of undue inducement as characterized by a choice to
engage in an activity even though a subject finds it objectionable in some significant way).
162 See, e.g., Emanuel, supra note 161; Ruth Macklin, 'Due' and 'Undue' Inducements: On
Paying Money to Research Subjects, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., May 1981, at 1; McNeill, supra
note 7, at 393; Savulescu, supra note 46.
163 See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. pt. 550, subpart 1 (2013) ("Pay for Duty Involving Physical Hardship or
Hazard").
164 But see Kevin Purse, Work-Related Fatality Risks and Neoclassical Compensating Wage
Differentials, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 597 (2004).
165 See Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 22, at 91 ("Note that we do not say that people are
coerced into taking jobs because they would otherwise be poor or unemployed.").
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the regular rate of pay for overtime worked beyond 40 hours per week;16 6 state
and local minimum wages may be even higher.
Then again, there are circumstances in which employment law permits
workers to go without payment, provided that they are either true volunteers
altruistically contributing to public welfare or are otherwise receiving adequate
nonmonetary compensation in the form of training or reputational benefit.' 67
Unpaid research participation may also be acceptable under similar
circumstances,'6 8 such as non-profit research conducted for the common good or
other types of research participation that offer therapeutic promise directly to
subjects adequate to compensate for their contribution. There are, of course, no
such prerequisites for unpaid research participation under the current regulatory
scheme. But even if we leave aside those circumstances in which subjects are not
paid but should be, the question remains: when a decision has been made to offer
payment for research participation,169 is there any reason subjects should not be
entitled to the same payment protections and liberties as paid workers?
One possibility is simple paternalism; we do not want subjects to exchange
their health for money, so we seek to discourage them from doing so to the extent
compatible with achieving sufficient enrollment. But even if one accepts
paternalistic justifications for regulation as legitimate, they fail to explain the
difference in treatment between subjects and other workers who also face various
physical risks for pay. There may also be some initial concern regarding topics
like commodification of the research subject, crowding out altruists, or
transformation of what should be a gift relationship into a commercial
166 Wage & Hour Div., Compliance Assistance - Wages and Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
167 See, e.g., Office of the Assistant Sec'y for Policy, Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor:
Volunteers, U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/docs/volunteers.asp (last visited
Nov. 22, 2013); Wage & Hour Div., Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Apr. 2010),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs7 1.pdf.
168 Some argue that unpaid research is one way to avoid subject exploitation. See Trisha
Phillips, Exploitation in Payments to Research Subjects, 25 BIOETHICS 209, 217-218 (2011)
("Avoiding exploitation does not require that researchers pay a fair wage; it merely requires that
they do not pay less than a fair wage.").
169 On the general question of whether subject payment is itself ethically permissible, there is
a tremendous body of literature considering aspects like the impact of payment on risk assessment
and consent, the tension between protecting against undue inducement and avoiding exploitation,
and various mechanisms of setting payment rates to avoid these problems. See ABADIE, supra note
27, at 6-7, 65-84; Dickert & Grady, supra note 29, at 386-96; Emanuel, supra note 161; Scott D.
Halpern, Financial Incentives for Research Participation: Empirical Questions, Available Answers
and the Burden of Further Proof 342 AM. J. MED. Sci. 290 (2011); McNeill, supra note 7; Open
Peer Commentaries, Money for Research Participation: Does It Jeopardize Informed Consent?, I
AM. J. BIOETHICS 45, 45-68 (2001) (multiple authors); Phillips, supra note 168; VanderWalde &
Kurzban, supra note 26; Martin Wilkinson & Andrew Moore, Inducement in Research, II
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transaction.170 However, so long as the regulations permit subjects to be paid
beyond simple reimbursement of their expenses, it seems the ship has sailed on
these concerns, and the focus should instead be on ensuring fair payment
amounts. Moreover, it really should be no more worrisome to commodify a
person's labor as a research subject than to commodify a person's labor in other
contexts, which happens all the time. Crowding out seems also to be a red herring
given that at least one of the reasons payment is currently offered is that altruistic
research participation does not suffice to meet demand,17 ' not to mention the fact
that altruistic subjects are always free to reject payment, if they so choose. And
there seems to be no discernible reason that research participation ought to be
treated as a gift when people prefer to be paid. Finally, and most importantly, it is
essential to recognize that none of these concerns actually drive the regulation of
payment to subjects, which instead is rooted exclusively in fears of undue
inducement. And so the question stands: why should paid subjects and paid
workers not be treated the same with regard to that payment?
1. Payment Ceiling
Breaking down the different aspects of payment, note that the concept of a
payment ceiling might be viewed as unique among the disparities between the
HSR and worklaw regimes considered herein. Elsewhere, we focus on
circumstances in which subjects are decidedly less protected than workers.
However, the absence of a payment ceiling in the context of most traditional
work might be characterized as a freedom rather than a protection, whereas the
presence of a ceiling for research participation is generally billed explicitly as a
subject protection. Thus, in this context, subjects might appear to be more
protected than workers at present, throwing a wrench into the rationale for
maintaining that it is the subject side of the analogy that should be open to
regulatory amendment and enhanced protections; eliminating the payment ceiling
could be viewed as leveling subjects down. On the other hand, there is also an
important sense in which restricting subject payment is not protective at all:
payment restrictions open subjects up to the exploitative possibility of being paid
too little, in which case it is the absence of a payment ceiling that is more
protective, as in the work setting. Given the dual nature of the payment
restrictions applicable to HSR - protective against undue inducement but
permissive of exploitation - it is necessary to step back and confirm that worklaw
provides the appropriate fixed standard when it comes to resolving payment
170 See, e.g., Tod Chambers, Participation as Commodity, Participation as Gift, I AM. J.
BIOETHICs 48 (2001). For a discussion of these arguments and why they fail to prove that payment
to subjects at any level is inherently problematic, see Dickert & Grady, supra note 29, at 391.
171 Note that the fact that research subjects can be paid places HSR in stark contrast to organ
donation, where crowding out is an oft-cited argument against initiation of an organ market, albeit
one with scant empirical evidence to support it. See Julia D. Mahoney, Altruism, Markets, and
Organ Procurement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 24-26 (2009).
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inconsistencies between subjects and workers. In other words, should we be
considering a payment ceiling for workers too?
Note that a maximum wage for work is not completely unheard of. In fact,
maximum wage laws existed in colonial America,172 and were also passed by
some state legislatures in the South after emancipation for reasons that were
decidedly anti-worker.1 73 More recently, some have suggested a cap on executive
compensation to help avoid adverse effects on economic conditions and financial
stability.174 Similarly, many professional sports leagues have adopted private pay
scales and salary caps that limit how much any player may receive in order to
keep more teams in the competitive range and preserve entertainment value.175
And government employees (and grant recipients) are also subject to maximum
pay rates to ensure judicious use of citizens' tax dollars.176
In none of these examples, however, is payment limited out of fear that
workers will suffer from undue inducement. In fact, when it comes to risky work,
many would suggest that workers deserve to be paid substantially more, not
less.177 Higher pay would likely also attract a broader swath of the population to
risky work, potentially allowing risks to be more evenly distributed rather than
concentrating them on the very worst off. Thus, rather than introducing fresh
concerns regarding undue inducement into the employment setting, it is more
appropriate to treat freely paid risky work as the fixed comparator. The next step
is to assess whether there is any reason to be more concerned when subjects
accept risks because they want or need the money, and whether this heightened
concern would justify retention of the payment ceiling in the research context
alone.
A number of reasons have been suggested in the literature, all of which fail.
For example, it cannot be that risks to subjects are greater, because the greatest
risk - death - is also present in some jobs. And it cannot be that the risks to
subjects are unreasonable or cannot be minimized, since this is specifically
regulated by IRBs. Nor can it be that risks to subjects are more uncertain or
172 William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 69 (1996).
173 James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom in the Constitutional Law of
"Involuntary Servitude, " 119 YALE L.J. 1474, 1534-1535 (2010).
174 Sarah B. Patterson, Note, Protecting Your Rights, But Not Your Paycheck: How Executive
Compensation Regulation Passes Constitutional Muster, I13 W. VA. L. REV. 931 (2011); Sam
Pizzigati, The Corporate Pay Gap: Do We Need a Maximum Wage?, PERSP. ON WORK, Summer
2009, http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/pubs/perspectives/CompArticles/POW_13.1 --Pizzigati.pdf.
175 See John Clayton, What New CBA Means in Football Terms, ESPN (July 25, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/ /id/6790759/what-new-nfl-cba-means-football-terms.
176 See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 531.221 (2013) ("Maximum Payable Rate Rule"); Frequently Asked
Questions: NIH Salary Cap in FY2012, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/fy20l2 salarycap-faqs.htm (last updated Feb. 14, 2012).
177 Some argue this is true for research as well. See, e.g., Eleri Jones & Kathleen Liddell,
Should Healthy Volunteers in Clinical Trials Be Paid According to Risk? Yes, 340 BRIT. MED. J.
130 (2010); Jerry Menikoff, Just Compensation: Paying Research Subjects Relative to the Risks
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unknown. First, it is unclear why a range of possible risk from minor to severe
should be more worrisome than a known risk concentrated at the higher end of
the spectrum, which is true of some jobs. Second, just because research involves
uncertainty does not necessarily mean that sensible predictions are impossible.1 79
Third, "it is probably false that research risks are, in general, poorly understood
compared to the risks undertaken by employees and volunteers. In fact, some
employees and volunteers, such as test pilots, take risks every day without
knowing their extent."180 And finally, to the extent that the inherent uncertainty
of research risk is not deemed to invalidate subject consent, it does not seem to
exacerbate the potential for undue inducement.
Perhaps the difference is that subjects are taking risks for the benefit of
others, so we should be especially concerned that those risks are undertaken
voluntarily, but that rationale fails as well. Firefighters also take risks for the
benefit of others, and paid subjects are often taking risks for their own financial
benefit. There may be a concern about therapeutic misconception in research that
is not present in the context of work,' 8' but if anything, payment could help make
clear that research is different from clinical care.182 And for both healthy and
patient-subjects, payment amount may be an important indication of risk level.' 83
Some worry that payment might blind subjects to potential risks, whereas
workplace risks may be more obvious, but empirical evidence on this is scant,' 84
and if it is a legitimate concern, the appropriate solution is to improve research
consent before restricting payment.'85 Some also maintain that it is disrespectful
to offer people money to entice them to overcome deeply held objections based
on their values, desires, or fears.' However, it happens all the time - just
consider the number of law school graduates who head straight for a high-paying
firm job knowing that the hours will make them unhappy or that they will pursue
goals for their clients that they personally disagree with. Ultimately, none of
these reasons convincingly suggest that avoidance of undue inducement is a
reason to limit payment to subjects but not to workers, or for that matter, to reject
178 McNeill, supra note 7, at 391.
179 Timothy Wilkinson, Assessing the Case for the Regulation of Research, 10 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 63, 64 (2010).
180 Sachs, supra note 7, at 74.
181 Id. at 74-75.
182 Dickert & Grady, supra note 29, at 392 (also noting that payment to patient-subjects could
"depersonalize the exchange, making it easier for patients to refuse and putting them on more equal
bargaining terms with investigators").
183 See Cynthia E. Cryder et al., Informative Inducement: Study Payment as a Signal of Risk,
70 Soc. SCI. & MED. 455 (2010).
184 See Scott D. Halpern et al., Empirical Assessment of Whether Moderate Payments Are
Undue or Unjust Inducements for Participation in Clinical Trials, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
801 (2004) (finding no evidence that commonly used payment levels represent undue
inducements).
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risk-based payments to subjects when such payments are expected and
encouraged for other work.
There are, however, a few possible concerns beyond undue inducement that
have been suggested as rendering unrestricted payment particularly worrisome in
the research setting. First, some subjects motivated by money may lie or withhold
information in order to enroll or stay in a trial,' 87 and/or enroll in multiple trials,
leading to both methodological and ethical concerns. For example, the validity of
trial data may be jeopardized if subjects fail to disclose prior or concurrent study
participation, evade exclusion criteria, violate study requirements, or fail to
report side effects. These behaviors might also hurt subjects themselves.'88
But does this really set research apart? Workers may lie about their
qualifications too, in ways that put both themselves and their employers' output
in jeopardy, and they may be enticed to do so by money. And their lies are in
many cases objectively detectable; a manager can ask for training certificates,
speak with previous employers, test competence, carefully oversee the work, and
the like. Similarly, although US regulations do not currently address the issue of
repeat or simultaneous participation, regulatory bodies, sponsors, and researchers
could implement national subject registries to track participants,189 impose and
enforce mandatory wash-out periods between trials, institute lifetime enrollment
caps, utilize more extensive screening before enrollment, and increase use of
physical testing rather than relying on qualitative subject feedback whenever
possible.' 90 Unless these solutions were unsuccessful, and unless empirical
evidence suggests that scientific integrity and subject safety are indeed being
harmed by the offer of unrestricted payment for participation, the fact that paid
subjects might be more likely to lie than those who are unpaid cannot justify a
limit on compensation to subjects but not for other jobs.
What about concern that without an upper limit on payment, some important
research will likely be unable to compete for subjects? 9' This would be
regrettable, but this problem is not unique to research either. In all sorts of jobs,
the public sector and non-profits must compete for workers with the private
sector and profit-driven companies. They often do so in non-monetary ways, for
example, by emphasizing civic duties and the importance of helping others. Even
when one company's mission might be clearly more desirable (from a moral
perspective) than another's, we do not limit the payment that can be offered by
187 Id. at 390; Carl L. Tishler & Suzanne Bartholomae, Repeat Participation Among Normal
Healthy Research Volunteers: Professional Guinea Pigs in Clinical Trials?, 46 PERSP. BIOL. &
MED. 508, 512-13 (2003); Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 42, 90, 103, 143. Note, however, that this
could be an issue for any subject motivated for reasons other than altruism.
188 ABADIE, supra note 27, at 154-55; Elliott, supra note 30; Elliott & Abadie, supra note 45,
at 2317; Tishler & Bartholomae, supra note 187, at 511, 512, 514-15; Wilkinson & Moore, supra
note 169, at 388; Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 42, 90, 103, 143.
189 See Resnick & Koski, supra note 38; Tishler & Bartholomae, supra note 187, at 517.
190 Tishler & Bartholomae, supra note 187, at 513.
191 Dickert & Grady, supra note 51, at 201; Trisha B. Phillips, A Living Wage for Research
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either. As a result, some socially valuable projects simply cannot flourish. Unless
clinical research is somehow different from these other important projects, which
may also aim to save lives or otherwise improve the world, competition for
subjects is not a reason to limit payment for participation. Note that the same
rationale applies to the concern that high payment to subjects will drive up the
cost of doing research and take resources from other important projects.
Ultimately, regardless of whether there is reason for genuine concern about
undue inducement of research subjects and/or other potential negative effects of
unrestricted or risk-based payment, there seem to be only two possible reasons to
treat research differently from other types of work in this regard, and both are
somewhat hypothetical. If high payments would in fact damage scientific
integrity, or if some essential research that is deemed more important than other
endeavors cannot compete for subjects, then it would be possible to justify
regulatory restrictions on subject payment even when such restrictions are not
present for other types of work. And of course, some types of payment restriction
for research participation would be completely consistent with a work regime,
such as a private "salary cap" negotiated between a group of sponsors and
subjects,192 or a regulatory cap for subjects in government-funded research. But
these circumstances would be exceptional, whereas restricted payment is now the
rule for HSR. Thus, we have our first case in which the subject-worker analogy
calls for a substantial rule change. 193
2. Minimum Wage
Removing payment restrictions for research subjects will eliminate one
excuse for payments that are too low. But, focusing again on consistency and the
need to treat like cases alike, should subjects also be guaranteed the minimum
wage? The reasons that supported unrestricted subject payment as discussed
above seem to suggest that here too the answer is yes. However, there are some
relevant differences in purpose that indicate the minimum wage need not be
extended to all paid subjects.
States began to introduce minimum wage laws in the early twentieth century
out of concern that many workers who were unable to effectively bargain with
their employers were receiving a wage below that necessary to provide an
192 A private salary cap would be permissible only if agreed upon in collaboration with
subjects through a labor agreement or if Congress adopted some exemption to antitrust laws for the
research context. See Labor and Collective Bargaining, AM. ANTITRUST INST.,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/labor-collective-bargaining (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
193 Others have also argued that there should be no upper limit on subject payment, but not
necessarily for all the same reasons articulated here and not necessarily for all subjects. See, e.g.,
Ackerman, supra note 28, at 1, 3; Anderson & Weijer, Wage Earner, supra note 57, at 375 n.8;
Elliott & Abadie, supra note 45, at 2317; Lemmens & Elliott, supra note 43, at 53; David B.
Resnick, Research Participation and Financial Inducements, I AM. J. BIOETHIcs 54, 55 (2001);
Shamoo & Resnick, supra note 34, at W10.
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adequate standard of living. The federal minimum wage was initially stimulated
by a desire to raise purchasing power and boost the economy, but the rationale
eventually expanded to include poverty reduction goals as well.194 Among other
things, Congress noted that "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of
the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers" burden commerce, constitute an unfair method of
competition, and lead to labor disputes.' 9 5
Importantly, these rationales for the minimum wage seem to apply only to
those research subjects who participate in research instead of or to complement
other work. For these subjects, the amount paid really does influence their
standard of living and purchasing power. In contrast, the rationales for a
minimum wage do not fit subjects who participate in research primarily for
altruistic or therapeutic reasons, even though they may also be paid and even
when payment might have pushed them over the tipping point in agreeing to
enroll.196 The difference is really whether subjects experience payment as a bonus
or as a wage. This could be operationalized, albeit somewhat imperfectly, by
extending the applicable minimum wage only to paid healthy subjects
participating in nontherapeutic research. Not everyone in this category may
actually need to be guaranteed the minimum wage, since at least some research
currently pays more and at least some subjects will select alternative
opportunities when the pay offered is insufficient. However, the same is true for
other work where the minimum wage is nonetheless extended because some
workers do need it - if Mark Zuckerberg flipped burgers for McDonald's, he
would be entitled to the same payment protections as everyone else.
That being said, there would be a few complexities associated with extending
the minimum wage to research subjects. For example, some of those who argue
that subjects currently get paid too little actually break down the subjects'
compensation into an hourly rate and call for overtime pay even though subjects
are not actively engaged in participation during the entire period of their
enrollment.' 97 Even in a confinement study, subjects are usually free for several
hours a day to pursue leisure activities of their own choosing, and in any study,
each hour of time spent as an enrolled subject is not worthy of equal
compensation. Thus, the question is whether subjects are closer to the security
guardl98 who gets paid for an entire shift even if he does no more than read a
book, or to the on-call employee who may not be entitled to the minimum wage
194 John Foley, Note, Questioning the Merits of Federal Minimum Wage Legislation, 5 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 679, 681-82 (2007); David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and
Low-Wage Workers: How Well Does Reality Match the Rhetoric?, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1296, 1298-
1303 (2008).
195 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
196 This distinction resolves potential uncertainty as to how to appropriately compensate
subjects monetarily when they are getting nonfinancial benefits from participation.
197 Anderson & Weijer, Entrepreneur, supra note 57, at 68.
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or overtime for hours spent on call.19 A further question is whether subjects are
confined for their own benefit so that they may be cared for in case of adverse
events, or for the benefit of the study to ensure compliance.200
Ultimately, the standard hourly minimum wage may be a poor fit for HSR,
given that subjects can be variably involved in active study visits, passive
observation periods, overnight confinement, and/or tasks carried out while at
home. Nonetheless, some regulatory minimum ought to exist for certain types of
subjects, and compensation based on a minimum rate per procedure, per day of
confinement, or per study visit may be most parsimonious. Again, for parity with
protected workers, the goal is to ensure that paid healthy subjects in
nontherapeutic research are paid an amount similar to what they could expect in
other minimum wage jobs given the same level of commitment and exertion.
Note, however, that this will not necessarily protect subjects against
exploitatively low payment,201 just as traditional workers may not be protected.
This is because fair payment based on contribution, time, inconvenience, risk,
discomfort, and other burdens may actually be higher than the minimum wage,
which takes none of these factors into account.202 In other words, the minimum
wage is often too low for workers or subjects. Moreover, considering that many
subjects are already getting paid amounts that make it worthwhile to participate
in research instead of taking other jobs,203 it is likely that removing the payment
ceiling will be the far more important change.
3. Unemployment
A final factor relevant to payment that ought to be briefly addressed
(especially given that research subjects have in fact sought eligibility for it) is
unemployment compensation. Employees are generally eligible for
199 Most courts have held that when an on-call employee is free to engage in personal
activities, such as watching television or visiting with friends, the time spent on call is not
compensable under FLSA, even when he has considerable restrictions placed on his geographic
mobility and activities. However, some courts have found on-call time to be compensable when
these restrictions are extreme and the employee is frequently called in to work. Stone, supra note
89, at 258. On the other hand, at least one court has held that even when the employee must remain
at the work site when on call, his time is not compensable when he is free to "free to sleep, eat,
watch television, watch VCR movies, play ping-pong or cards, read, listen to music . . . ." Rousseau
v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., 805 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986).
200 See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132 (1944) (holding that waiting time
is compensable under FLSA if it is "primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business"
(quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590, 597-98)).
201 Phillips, supra note 168, at 210-12. There is also a sense in which subjects might be
exploited by payments that are too high if that would cause undue inducement. See VanderWalde &
Kurzban, supra note 26, at 552.
202 See Phillips, supra note 191.
203 See Jessica Latterman & Jon F. Merz, How Much Are Subjects Paid to Participate in
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unemployment when they become involuntarily unemployed. 2 04 However, states
differ with regard to whether an employee will be considered to have quit
voluntarily when he knowingly takes a temporary job that ends as planned.20 5
Thus, failure to extend benefits to subjects may not actually be inconsistent with
the treatment of other workers, at least not in all jurisdictions, given the
temporary nature of research participation. But even if we assume that temporary
workers should be covered, there is good reason that research subjects should
not.
One of the goals of unemployment compensation is to stabilize
employment, which it achieves through a stick: an experience rating that requires
employers to pay an additional tax for its former employees receiving
unemployment benefits.206 This does not fit the research context, however,
because the work offered in any given study will never be permanent (even if a
given subject is a "professional"), leaving nothing to incentivize through the
experience rating. Moreover, it does not seem fair to expect a party to subsidize
unemployment when it could not have helped a subject avoid it.20 7 Even if
subjects would benefit from such protection, there is no one but the government
that could be appropriately asked to pay, and other aspects of the social safety net
seem better suited to help smooth the transition for those who rely on research
208participation for money.
B. Care and Compensation for Injury
Moving on from payment for participation, another key area in which the
HSR regulations seem to offer less protection than worklaw has to do with what
204 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., 2012 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS, at ch. 4 (Comm. Print 2012), http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2012-green-
book/chapter-4-unemployment-insurance/introduction-and-overview (subsection on
"Unemployment Insurance Introduction and Overview").
205 Sachin S. Pandya, Retrofitting Unemployment Insurance to Cover Temporary Workers, 17
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 907, 919-23 (1999); Stone, supra note 89, at 264-66.
206 Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV.
335, 344-45 (2001); Pandya, supra note 205, at 925.
207 A potential analogy here are the exceptions found in some state laws that permit seasonal
employers to avoid certain unemployment insurance requirements and that disqualify seasonal
employees from receiving benefits for unemployment outside the normal operating season. See
generally Rex Williams, Seasonal Unemployment Compensation: Insurance of a Known and
Certain Loss, 4 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 75 (1994).
208 Another problem is that those receiving unemployment benefits must accept "suitable"
offers of work, and similar work to that lost is generally deemed suitable. Pandya, supra note 205,
at 923-24. Thus, unemployed subjects might be compelled to enroll in other studies for which they
are qualified or lose their entitlement to compensation, in violation of the voluntariness requirement
imposed by the research regulations. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2013); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(8)
(2013). The same is true whenever someone takes a job simply because the fact that it was offered
renders them ineligible for future unemployment benefits, although there may be reason to believe
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happens in the event of injury. On the one hand, with the exception of limited
policies adopted by a handful of federal agencies, 209 the regulations do not
require that any special provisions be made for subjects harmed via research
participation.21 o On the other, injured subjects are free to pursue usual legal
remedies, and the regulations preclude informed consent materials from
including any exculpatory language. 211 However, for all litigants, the tort system
is "time-consuming, adversarial, expensive, and has a tendency to under-
compensate most . . . [of those injured] while over-compensating a select few." 2 12
Unfortunately, it is even more problematic for injured research subjects, who are
likely to have difficulty showing that any duty to them was breached, that the
research caused their injury,213 that they did not assume the risk through informed
consent, and most importantly, that their injury was anyone's fault, since even
214
perfectly conducted research can result in harm. Moreover, several classes of
research subjects, particularly those in federally conducted and international
research, are prevented from receiving compensation altogether as a result of
statutory and procedural barriers to tort litigation.215
In contrast, most employers are legally responsible under various workers'
compensation statutes for guaranteeing payment of benefits to covered
employees216 who sustain injuries (including illness and death) that "arise out of'
209 See Moral Science, supra note 17, at 65-66 (and accompanying notes), 184-85 (describing
limited provisions to provide free care to subjects injured in studies sponsored by entities such as
the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, NIH Clinical Center, Environmental
Protection Agency, and NASA).
210 Cf 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(6) (requiring that informed consent
include an explanation of whether any compensation is provided in the event of injury).
211 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; 21 C.F.R. § 50.20; OHRP & FDA, Guidance on Exculpatory
Language in Informed Consent, HHS (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM271036.pdf (draft
guidance).
212 Elizabeth R. Pike, Recovering from Research: A No-Fault Proposal to Compensate
Injured Research Participants, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 23 (2012). See also Wendy K. Mariner,
Compensation for Research Injuries, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES, 113, 121 (Anna C. Mastroianni et al. eds.,
1994); Resnick, supra note 31, at 283.
213 INsT. OF MED. (IOM), RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 193 (Daniel D. Federman et al. eds., 2002); Robert Steinbrook,
Compensation for Injured Research Subjects, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1871, 1872 (2006).
214 See 1OM, supra note 213, at 188; Pike, supra note 211, at 23-24, 26-29; Larry D. Scott,
Research-Related Injury: Problems and Solutions, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 419, 423 (2003);
VanderWalde and Kurzban, supra note 26, at 546.
215 See Pike, supra note 212, at 29-38 (referring to sovereign immunity, the Federal Tort
Claims Act and its discretionary function exception, the Alien Tort Statute, and forum non
conveniens). This problem is solidified by the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality
constrains courts exercising their power under the Alien Tort Statute).
216 This includes the vast majority of employers and employees in traditional employer-
employee relationships. There are, however, some statutory exceptions in both directions. For
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and "in the course of their employment," without regard to the fault of either
party. In exchange, employers are immunized from tort suits for negligence in
217causing or contributing to the injury.
Before this system was in place, injured workers were seldom compensated,
for a variety of reasons ranging from failure to bring suit to difficulty overcoming
employers' defenses.218 But as industrial accidents were on the rise around the
turn of the twentieth century, and it grew clear that workers may not be
adequately compensated for the risks of occupational injury through their wages,
the failures of tort law remedies became politically and socially unacceptable.219
Workers' compensation laws were adopted nationwide to provide injured
workers a less expensive mechanism of swift, certain compensation by moving
the system out of court and eliminating any requirement to prove fault.220
Workers are not necessarily made whole and there is no compensation for pain
and suffering or other noneconomic damages, nor any mechanism for punitive
damages, which benefits employers. But workers' medical care is fully covered,
as is some significant fraction of wage loss; in the event of death, survivors
receive income and burial benefits. 22 1 In addition, since employers pay all
benefits, either directly or through insurance, the system forces them to
internalize the cost of injuries incidental to their business. 222 Unfortunately, these
goals are not always perfectly achieved, particularly since disputes can remain
regarding an injury's job-relatedness and the extent of disability, necessitating
litigation.2 11
It may not be flawless, but the fact remains that on the whole, injured
workers are more protected by the law than injured subjects, even if they recover
less than they might if successful in court. Moreover, the same goals and
problems driving the workers' compensation system seem similarly applicable to
the research context. In fact, a "series of national advisory committees convened
example, employers with very few employees may not be covered, and non-employee workers such
as volunteers may be. See infra, Part IV.B.4.
217 See Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925, 931 (1984) (describing
the workers' compensation quid pro quo); Ellen R. Peirce & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Workers'
Compensation and Occupational Disease: A Return to Original Intent, 67 OR. L. REv. 649, 653
(1988).
218 Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and Employer: An
Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 403, 405 (1998).
219 Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 217, at 652, 655.
220 Id. at 652-53.
221 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, I10TH CONG., 2008 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITrEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS, at sec. 15 (Comm. Print 2008), http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/
democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/wess8.pdf (section on "Workers'
Compensation").
222 Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 217, at 653-54.
223 See, e.g., Gwen Forte, Rethinking America's Approach to Workplace Safety: A Model for
Advancing Safety Issues in the Chemical Industry, 53 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 513, 522-23 (2005);
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to consider the obligations owed in the event of research-related injury have
concluded repeatedly that injured research participants are entitled to
compensation for their injuries, that the tort system provides inadequate remedy,
and that the United States should consider some form of no-fault
compensation." 224 Indeed, unlike payment for participation, which is the source
of substantial controversy, the contested question regarding care and
compensation for injured subjects is not so much about desert as about scope and
logistics.
Most commenters agree that there is an obligation to ensure that subjects do
not individually bear the costs of medical care required to treat harms directly
resulting from their research participation, without regard to fault. 225 There is less
agreement, however, as to whether there is any obligation to compensate subjects
for economic and noneconomic harms beyond the costs of care.226 And there is
even less agreement as to whether regulatory intervention is needed to ensure that
obligations to injured subjects are satisfied, and if so, what the ideal intervention
22728would look like. Some have suggested the workers' compensation model,228
and since the question here is whether there is any compelling reason to treat
subjects differently from other protected workers, workers' compensation will be
our focus.
224 Pike, supra note 212, at 10.
225 See, e.g., IOM, supra note 213, at 193; Hazel Beh, Compensation for Research Injuries,
IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., May-June 2005, at 11, 12; Mariner, supra note 212, at 117; Pike, supra
note 212; Resnick, supra note 31, at 286; Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human
Participants, NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N (NBAC) 123 (2001),
http://bioethics.georgetown.edulnbac/human/overvoll.pdf; International Ethical Guidelines for
Biomedical Research, COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. ScIs. (CIOMS) 78-79 (2002),
http://www.cioms.ch/publications/layout guide2002.pdf; Moral Science, supra note 17, at 62 and
app. IV; World Med. Ass'n, World Medical Association Declaration ofHelsinki: Ethical Principles
for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (Oct. 19, 2013),
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articlelD= 1760318.
226 For arguments in favor of compensation of economic loss beyond the costs of care, see
IOM, supra note 213, at 193; Scott, supra note 214, at 424; CIOMS, supra note 225, at 78. . See
also Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Dep't of Health) Notification, 2013, Gazette of India,
pt. II, sec. 3(i) (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.elsevierbi.com/-/media/Supporting%20Documents/Pharmasia%2ONews/2013/Februar
y/Clinical%20Trials%20Compensation%20Guidelines.pdf (going to extreme lengths to demand
care and compensation for injured subjects).
227 See, e.g., LEWIN GROUP, FINAL REPORT: CARE/COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES IN CLINICAL
RESEARCH 21 (2005); Moral Science, supra note 17, at 64-70; Steinbrook, supra note 213, at 1873.
228 Bernard R. Adams & Marilyn Shea-Stonum, Toward a Theory of Control of Medical
Experimentation with Human Subjects: The Role of Compensation, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 604,
637-38 (1975); Beh, supra note 225, at 13; Elliott & Abadie, supra note 45, at 2317; Scott, supra
note 214, at 424; Irving Ladimer, Clinical Research Insurance, 16 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 1229, 1233
(1963); LEWIN GROUP, supra note 227, at 19; Resnick, supra note 31, at 283-85; David B. Resnick,
Liability for Institutional Review Boards: From Regulation to Litigation, 25 J. LEG. MED. 131, 182-
83 (2004). Other approaches have also been suggested. See Moral Science, supra note 17, at 64;
Pike, supra note 212, at 47-53.
169
48
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 14 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol14/iss1/3
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
So, is there any such reason for differential protection? The Presidential
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, the most recent national body to
take up this question, implies that the answer is no, at least as an ethical matter.
Although it refused to adopt the idea of subject as wage-earner,2 29 the
Commission noted that if subjects are employees in a dangerous job, it would be
unjust to exclude them from a form of workers' compensation available to
employees in other industries. 230 The Commission did not, however, go so far as
to endorse the workers' compensation model for HSR, or any change at all to the
status quo. Instead, it argued that before any compensation scheme can be
implemented in this realm there are questions regarding "the scope of any
possible coverage, the delineation of qualified harms, mechanisms for
determination of causation and qualification, relation to the tort system, the need
for any special public or private insurance, and how the current nonsystematic
approach to this issue functions in practice."2 3 1 Each of these issues is addressed
in the sections below, but none provides the sort of relevant difference that can
justify the disparity between the legal protections offered to injured workers and
the lack of such protections for injured subjects.
1. Scope, Need, and Burden
With regard to scope of coverage, workers' compensation goes beyond what
is currently agreed on (albeit not mandated) for injured subjects, but it does not
go too far. This is because the same arguments that support protecting subjects
from shouldering medical costs on their own seem to support protecting them and
their dependents from fully bearing the weight of lost earnings, just as workers'
compensation does. First, even though subjects may benefit financially or
therapeutically from research, these benefits may not fully compensate for the
risks they face, and even if they do, society and others also reap the benefits and
should not be allowed to free-ride. Moreover, financial losses of all types are
among risks to subjects that can be minimized, and beneficence and non-
maleficence support a system of compensation. Finally, recruitment will
potentially benefit if subjects know they will not be left to face financial risks
completely on their own.232 Thus, the scope of workers' compensation
coverage for both medical costs and a portion of lost wages - seems to be the
229 Moral Science, supra note 17, at 119 n.103.
230 Id. at 61.
231 Id. at 62. Note that the Commission's charge was specific to federally-funded research.
232 Beh, supra note 225, at 12; Moral Science, supra note 17, at 119 n.103, Pike, supra note
212, at 19-20, 56; Resnick, supra note 31, at 282; see also VanderWalde & Kurzban, supra note
26, at 545 (noting that the arguments in support of compensating subjects for research-related
injury include encouraging research participation, relieving social discontent, fulfilling moral
obligations to subjects, ensuring a just social distribution of resources, and incentivizing researchers
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very minimum level of appropriate compensation for injuries in the HSR
-233setting.
There are, however, two possible, mutually exclusive reasons not to
implement a similar legal compensation system for injured subjects: (1) such a
system is unnecessary because the needs of injured subjects are already being
adequately satisfied through a patchwork of alternate mechanisms; or (2) such a
system would be unduly burdensome on the research enterprise. 234 The first, if
true, would seem to be a relevant difference justifying stronger (or more formal)
protections for injured workers than injured subjects, given that workers' needs
were not adequately satisfied in the absence of legally mandated compensation.
On the other hand, the second, even if true, would require some additional
argument to explain why the burdens imposed on research by such a
compensation scheme would be more problematic than the burdens imposed on
other endeavors for which workers' compensation is required. However, since
these are at least partly empirical claims, it is best to start with the empirical data.
First, it appears likely that injured subjects are not in fact being adequately
compensated in the absence of a formal compensation system. More data are
needed, but a 2005 study of over 100 academic medical center policies concluded
that a subject's own health insurance serves as the "primary vehicle" for covering
the cost of research-related injuries.235 Of course, not everyone has health
insurance, and even if the Affordable Care Act and state initiatives are successful
in achieving more universal coverage, policies vary in their inclusions and
exclusions, copays, deductibles, and limits. More importantly, even if all health
insurance covered clinical trial injuries, 236 two problems would remain: injured
subjects would still be paying for their own care via copays and other fees, and
more importantly, it would remain health insurance, which of course does not
cover other economic damages an injured subject may incur. Yet the study found
that no institution or sponsor was offering to compensate injured subjects for lost
wages or pain and suffering.2 37 And with regard to medical care, only 16% of the
policies prospectively indicated a plan to provide free care or treatment for
233 One substantial concern is that requiring compensation for lost wages will drive the
exclusion of high wage subjects from research and increase the recruitment of low wage subjects,
with attendant justice issues. Dickert & Grady, supra note 51. This problem may be mitigated by
capping wage recovery, precisely as workers' compensation does, although additional intervention
may also be necessary.
234 Moral Science, supra note 17, at 67-68.
235 LEWIN GROUP, supra note 227, at ES-3. The policies in question were generally sample
informed consent forms and other information available on the web sites of major medical centers.
Id. at 4.
236 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires health insurers to pay for routine
costs of care delivered in clinical trials, but it is unclear whether that includes care for study-related
injury. Carmen Phillips, Insurance Coverage Expanding for Cancer Clinical Trials, NCI CANCER
BULL. (May 18, 2010), http://www.cancer.gov/ncicancerbulletin/051810/page5.
237 LEWIN GROUP, supra note 227.
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injured subjects, with an additional 10% billing a subject's insurance first, but
providing free care or treatment to those without coverage.238
A similar study found that of medical schools with template language for
industry-sponsored research available on their websites, 61% declare that the
industry sponsor would pay the medical expenses of research-related injury. In
contrast, when there is no industry sponsor, only 22% of the schools offer some
form of financial support, and half of those limit coverage to emergency medical
care. In addition, 72% of medical school consent forms specifically rule out the
possibility of additional monetary compensation, as distinguished from free or
reimbursed care, and no schools explicitly offered such compensation. 23 9
That being said, these policies - which are themselves only a limited sample
may not necessarily reflect what happens after an injury actually occurs, when
sites may be more generous than their policies dictate.240 And representatives of
the pharmaceutical industry have recently asserted that most industry-based
clinical research sponsors voluntarily or contractually agree to carry insurance to
compensate individuals injured in trials, although this is not required by law.24 1
Thus, on the most generous analysis, it may be the case that at least some injured
subjects are in fact being adequately cared for and/or compensated for their care
without having to reach into their own pockets, albeit on an ad hoc basis.
Nonetheless, combining the available data with what we know about the
obstacles an injured subject would face in court, the same is almost certainly not
true for other economic costs of research-related injury. Accordingly, the lack of
necessity argument likely fails as an empirical matter, pending further data.
However, it is important to recognize that having already established as the
starting point that differential protection of subjects and workers requires
justification, the onus should fall on those who claim that injured subjects do not
need a workers' compensation system to demonstrate that to be the case. In other
words, in the absence of complete data, the default should be to extend a
workers' compensation system to injured subjects, rather than waiting until the
data indicates such a system is needed. Similarly, the fact that there is little
systematic and current information about the severity, frequency, and type of
injuries that subjects experience and their costS242 does not itself provide a reason
to reject a compensation system for injured subjects until affordability has been
established.
238 Steinbrook, supra note 213, at 1872.
239 Michael K. Paasche-Orlow & Frederick L. Brancati, Assessment of Medical School
Institutional Review Board Policies Regarding Compensation of Subjects for Research-Related
Injury, 118 AM. J. MED. 175, 177 (2005). Medical schools' IRB websites were examined for
suggested text for informed consent documentation, which was then surveyed for text related to
injury and compensation.
240 LEWIN GROUP, supra note 227; Steinbrook, supra note 213, at 1873.
241 Moral Science, supra note 17, at 66.
242 IOM, supra note 213, at vii-viii, 191-192; LEWIN GROUP, supra note 227, at ES-1, 2;
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But even if there were evidence that such a system would be very costly,
hindering research more than the prospect of litigation does at present-which
there is not 24 3 -that would still not necessarily suffice to justify the status quo, as
some have claimed. 244 This is because although burden is not completely
extraneous to the workers' compensation analysis, it is only minimally relevant.
Only very small employers are excluded from the law's requirements, and only
in some states.245 Moreover, concern for cost or burden does not usually limit the
workers' compensation claims of nonprofit employees or others who also may be
246
doing socially valuable work.26 Thus, as was the case with regard to unrestricted
subject payment, in order for cost to justify a refusal to protect injured subjects to
the same extent as injured workers, it would have to be demonstrated that
research progress is more critical than progress in other areas that might be
affected by workers' compensation requirements. Bearing that possible caveat in
mind, no convincing case exists thus far for differential treatment between the
two groups.
2. Covered Harm and Causation
With these broad issues of scope, need, and burden resolved, the next
question is whether there are any details of the workers' compensation system
that would render a similar approach for injured subjects unworkable, since of
course this would be a legitimate reason to protect subjects differently.
Ultimately, some tweaking would be needed, but there is nothing so inherently
different about the research context that a system of guaranteed and systematic
compensation for injury ought to be rejected.
As for the types of harm that qualify for payment, workers' compensation
seems to be a mixed fit for research. First, it fits well with regard to covering
only those injuries that would result in documentable financial loss, and not
243 Serious research injuries are likely to be few and manageable, suggesting that the cost of
care will be low and injuries will not keep subjects out of work for long. LEWIN GROUP, supra note
227, at ES-2, 32-33; Mariner, supra note 212, at 118; Pike, supra note 212, at 60-61; Resnick,
supra note 31, at 265; Steinbrook, supra note 213, at 1873. Nonetheless, a system of guaranteed
compensation for subjects would almost certainly be more expensive than the status quo, since no-
fault compensation plans "may help reduce the number of large awards to subjects [awarded
through the tort system] only at the expense of increasing the number of small awards." Resnick,
supra note 31, at 284. But importantly, this equation does not account for how research is currently
hindered by costly defensive behavior generated by fear of litigation that may never come to pass
or be successful.
244 See Beh, supra note 225, at 12; LEWIN GROUP, supra note 227, at 1-2; Moral Science,
supra note 17, at 67; Resnick, supra note 31, at 267.
245 Workers Compensation Laws - State by State Comparison, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. Bus.,
http://www.nfib.com/legal-center/compliance-resource-center/compliance-resource-
item/cmsid/57181 (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
246 Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges and Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28
U.S.F. L. REv. 85, 117 (1993).
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minor problems like transient nausea likely to occur in a great deal of trials. 24 7
Second, coverage of harms without regard to fault appears to be appropriate for
HSR, given that none of the reasons articulated above for cost shifting away from
injured subjects depends on fault or the lack thereof.248 Moreover, no-fault
systems can have a variety of benefits such as speed, cost-effectiveness, and
congeniality that would be beneficial in the research setting, and nearly every
country that sponsors, hosts, or conducis substantial amounts of research - other
than the U.S. - has implemented a no-fault compensation system for research-
related injury, demonstrating feasibility. 249
However, the fact that workers' compensation covers harms arising out of
and in the course of work is likely too broad, at least for some subjects. This is
because those participating in therapeutic or prevention research might have
experienced harms in clinical care that would have been similar in type or
magnitude to those caused by research. Although these harms would meet the
workers' compensation standard, compensating the subject looks like a windfall;
this should not be a qualified harm.2 50 A related issue is that all effective
therapies and preventative interventions have benefits and drawbacks, such that a
subject in a therapeutic or prevention study might be benefited in one way and
injured in another.251 Ultimately, the workers' compensation standard for
compensable injury is not equipped to handle this sort of problem because it is
meant to remedy pure harms. Countervailing medical benefits and harms are
likely to be common for HSR, however, and really cannot be ignored.
For subjects in therapeutic or prevention research, then, qualified harms must
be more circumscribed than they are for purposes of worker's compensation.
Rather than all injuries arising out of and in the course of research, qualified
harms should be limited to those different or worse than what subjects could have
252expected in clinical care, and within that subset, limited to net harms. In
addition, net harms should not be discounted on the basis of financial benefits
(i.e., any payment a subject receives for participating), which is consistent with
the fact that workers are compensated for work-related injury regardless of how
much they make.
The research setting also poses other difficulties, but they are not necessarily
unique. For example, when patients become subjects, it may be difficult to
distinguish whether the symptoms experienced are compensable harms caused by
the research or whether they are just the consequence of the subject's underlying
247 Pike, supra note 212, at 57.
248 Beh, supra note 225, at 12; Moral Science, supra note 17, at 63.
249 Pike, supra note 212, at 46.
250 See Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 228, at 642; Pike, supra note 212, at 46.
251 See Moral Science, supra note 17, at 69 (noting that it is necessary to determine whether
compensable research injury should include side effects that follow an effective therapeutic
intervention); VanderWalde & Kurzban, supra note 26, at 546 (questioning whether it is a harm
when an experimental intervention lengthens life but causes other side effects).
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condition.253 However, a determination of research-relatedness must already be
made for purposes of reporting adverse events to regulatory agencies and IRBs,
so this problem is familiar and cannot be avoided.254 It is also already being
addressed by the research institutions and handful of regulatory policies that
currently provide or require compensation for study-related injury.25 Moreover,
256similar questions can arise for workers' compensation, particularly given its
coverage of occupational disease that may be less obviously linked to the
workplace because it develops over time and/or occurs in the general population
25as an ordinary disease of life. 2 Recovering monetary costs in such cases is not
necessarily easy, 258 but the point is that factual issues of causation are not foreign
to workers' compensation or to research. Thus, standing alone, difficulty in
establishing causation for research-related injury is not a reason to treat injured
subjects differently. 259 And, importantly, for some research-related injuries,
causation will be readily apparent.
3. Funding, Tort Preemption, and Additional Concerns
There remain a few additional reasons to suggest that even though injured
subjects should be compensated, the workers' compensation mechanism might
not be the right approach. First, perhaps the fact that medical research redounds
to the public benefit 260 suggests that unlike the workers' compensation system,
which is funded by employers, the compensation system for injured subjects
should be publicly funded.261 But many companies perform work that is socially
valuable and still remain directly responsible for workers' compensation
coverage. There is also a very clear sense in which compensation for subjects'
injuries will be paid by the public, despite being paid first by those conducting
the research: if research is conducted with federal money, compensation would
come out of tax revenues, and if research is privately-sponsored, the cost of
compensation would be rolled into the prices of medical products.262
253 See Alexander M. Capron, When Experiments Go Wrong: The U.S. Perspective, 15 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 22, 25 (2004); LEWIN GROUp, supra note 227, at 33; IOM, supra note 213, at 193;
Mariner, supra note 212, at 121; Pike, supra note 212, at 28, 56; Resnick, supra note 31, at 266;
Steinbrook, supra note 213, at 1872; VanderWalde & Kurzban, supra note 26, at 546.
254 Pike, supra note 212, at 54-55.
255 See, e.g., Moral Science, supra note 17, at 122 n.117 (describing institutional
compensation programs at the University of Washington and elsewhere).
256 See Resnick, supra note 31, at 266 (recognizing that courts and workers' compensation
panels have to deal with complex causation problems on a routine basis).
257 Subjects' injuries may also be latent.
258 See generally STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 221, at 2; Peirce &
Dworkin, supra note 217, at 659.
259 See, e.g., Pike, supra note 212, at 56.
260 Mariner, supra note 212, at 121; Moral Science, supra note 17, at 58-60.
261 See Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 228, at 640-41.
262 See VanderWalde & Kurzban, supra note 26, at 545.
175
54
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 14 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol14/iss1/3
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
What about the issue of tort preemption? Some have suggested that injured
subjects should have the option of accepting no-fault compensation and waiving
their right to sue, or waiving their right to no-fault compensation and suing
instead.263 This would give subjects who are likely to be undercompensated by
the no-fault scheme a chance to do better, but it is unclear why subjects should
get this opportunity when other workers do not. Perhaps the difference is that
whereas subjects are unlikely to be at fault for their injuries, workers'
compensation as the exclusive remedy for workplace injury despite employer
fault was a concession to employers who would be responsible for payment
despite employee fault. 264 Nonetheless, the fact remains that injured subjects
would be able to recover even in the absence of any fault whatsoever. Thus, those
conducting research have a similar argument that they should not also have to
face greater liability when they are in fact at fault.
In addition, there is a sense in which a single system for compensating
injured subjects is fairer, since similarly injured subjects will be compensated
similarly without regard to their sophistication to navigate the tort system, for
example. Another potentially attractive feature of no-fault compensation paired
with tort preemption is that it could increase subject trust and solidarity with
researchers by sending a clear message: you will be taken care of, there is no
need to fight to get what you are rightfully owed, and there is no room for
adversity in the research relationship.265 There is some concern that an exclusive
no-fault approach will be less able to deter bad behavior,266 but eliminating the
specter of negligence liability may help minimize the defensive posture that has
come to predominate the culture of HSR, reflected in everything from legalistic
consent to overly nit-picky IRB review. 267 That said, however, it would be
appropriate to preserve the opportunity to sue in the event of intentional or
egregious behavior, which some workers' compensation laws allow. 268
263 See Beh, supra note 225, at 12, 13; Mariner, supra note 212, at 119; Pike, supra note 212,
at 49; Resnick, supra note 31, at 283. This is how the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program works. See Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP), NAT'L VACCINE INFO.
CENTER, http://www.nvic.org/injury-compensation.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2013); Beh, supra
note 225, at 13.
264 Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 228, at 639.
265 On the other hand, it is possible that tort preemption could have the unintended
consequence of scaring away potential subjects who are wary of relinquishing their right to sue.
And the workers' compensation system itself can become adversarial, as previously noted. See
supra note 223 and accompanying text; see also ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 130 (2001).
266 Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 228, at 643.
267 See IOM, supra note 213, at 189, 122, 178, 181; NBAC, supra note 225, at 13, 62, 117;
see also Resnick, supra note 31, at 283 (explaining that a no-fault system may improve systems and
procedures for preventing injuries by encouraging open communication).
268 See, e.g., Workers' Compensation: Can I Sue My Employer Instead?, FINDLAW,
http://injury.findlaw.com/workers-compensation/workers-compensation-basics-overview/workers-
comp-sue-employer.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013); Workers' Compensation Agency, Frequently
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Other possible reasons for differential approaches for injured workers and
injured subjects can also be rejected. Most commentators maintain that subjects'
consent to research participation cannot waive their moral right to compensation
for injury,269 and although consent to work may now take the existence of
workers' compensation into account as part of what is being agreed to, workers'
consent did not previously vitiate their moral claims to implementation of such a
system. It also does no work to point out that some subjects are motivated by
their own self-interest, 270 since the same is true of workers. Finally, there is no
more need for concern that a compensation system would be viewed as a license
to embark on riskier research than it would be viewed as a license to permit more
dangerous workplaces, 271 and the same safety and review standards would remain
in place regardless of compensation for injury.
4. Unpaid Subjects
Although the preceding discussion has laid the case for compensating injured
subjects and injured workers similarly, one important question remains. Since
unpaid workers - volunteers - are often excluded from workers' compensation
coverage as nonemployees, should the same be true for unpaid subjects?
There are generally two types of unpaid subjects, the pure altruist and the
subject induced to participate by nonmonetary benefits such as possible
therapeutic improvement. The latter resembles the unpaid intern seeking
professional advancement in the sense that both are volunteering primarily for
their own purposes and are remunerated in an important but non-monetary way.
Moreover, both may make important contributions to the projects in which they
are involved.272  Some states specifically exclude interns from workers'
compensation coverage, but elsewhere, courts and administrative boards have
granted them benefits, which seems to be the right approach given interns' likely
lack of bargaining power and the problems with tort litigation described above.273
That same protection should apply to the unpaid benefit-seeking subject,
191-27210-41833--F,00.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2013); Workplace Injury: When You Can Sue
Outside of Workers' Compensation, NOLO, http://www.nolo.comlegal-encyclopedia/workplace-
injury-lawsuit-sue-30334.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
269 Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 228, at 609; James F. Childress, Compensating
Injured Research Subjects: The Moral Argument, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (1976); IOM, supra
note 213, at 191; Moral Science, supra note 17, at 58-60; Pike, supra note 212, at 20-21; Scott,
supra note 214, at 421. But see Steinbrook, supra note 213, at 1872 (noting the contrary view that
"routine compensation is not required because subjects are made aware of the risks through the
informed-consent process, understand them, and voluntarily agree to participate").
270 See Beh, supra note 225, at 12.
271 See Adams & Shea-Stonum, supra note 228, at 641 n.95-96.
272 But note that this may necessitate payment under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
273 Mark Schappert, Employers' Internship Toolkit (2005), LE MOYNE C. (Aug. 2005),
http://www.lemoyne.edu/Portals/1 1/pdf content/career services/INTERNSHIPTOOLKIT.pdf.
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considering that all of the same rationales described above for offering
compensation for research-related injury hold true, and also because these
subjects likely depend on the research in some way that renders it difficult for
them to negotiate for such compensation on their own. 2 74
On the other hand, altruistic unpaid subjects pose an interesting paradox.
They could presumably walk away from research opportunities with ease if they
(1) understood the likelihood and potential severity of research injury, and that
they would be on their own in the event injury occurs, and (2) found that to be
unacceptable. This suggests that no intervention is really needed, although some
have questioned whether the first assumption is really true.275 But even if it is,
failing to mandate compensation when these subjects are injured seems to
contradict the fact that altruists have the greatest moral claim to such
compensation - after all, they are taking on risks and burdens exclusively for
others. Shouldering the cost of injury may be part of the gift such altruists are
willing to make, but it does not seem reasonable to expect altruists to either make
such a sacrifice or refrain from research participation, especially when others
who made lesser sacrifices (in the sense of having greater self-interest) would be
provided compensation. Then again, this is precisely what happens in some
cases. For example, volunteers helping to build a house for Habitat for Humanity
might have to sign a waiver and release of liability explicitly recognizing that
they are not covered by workers' compensation insurance, even though a
construction employee doing exactly the same thing while getting paid would be
covered .276
What to do, then, with the true volunteer subject? Although it would not be
outrageous or inconsistent to exclude them from mandatory no-fault
compensation for injury,277 the more attractive option is to treat them like other
volunteers who perform risky work that is highly socially valuable, offering
protection as a matter of justice rather than to remedy inadequate bargaining
power. For example, some states have chosen to recognize the "unselfish
service" of volunteer emergency workers by covering them under workers'
compensation laws. 278 Given that altruistic volunteer subjects would face the
274 Mariner, supra note 212, at 123.
275 See Pike, supra note 212, at 44-45 (arguing that research subjects are not aware of the
extent to which they are legally unprotected in the event of injury); see also Mariner, supra note
212, at 117.
276 See, e.g., Waiver of Liability, HABITAT FOR HUMANITY SMITH COUNTY,
http://www.smithcountyhabitat.org/volunteer-waiver-of-liability.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
However, some organizations will voluntarily offer some protection to volunteer workers. See, e.g.,
Frequently Asked Questions, Volunteering: General Questions, HABITAT FOR HUMANITY GREATER
Bos. http://www.habitatboston.org/faq.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
277 James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge Capacity Through the
Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. POL'Y 5, 51 (2005).
278 See, e.g., Volunteer Firefighter's and Volunteer Ambulance Worker's Guide to Workers'
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same difficulties recovering in tort as other injured subjects, and given the
potential value of limiting liability in the research setting, as well as the symbolic
importance of protecting those engaged in socially valuable activities, all types of
research subjects - paid and unpaid, healthy and patient, enrolled in therapeutic
and nontherapeutic research - should be entitled to at least the same benefits
guaranteed to injured workers under the workers' compensation system: no-fault
compensation for at least the costs of medical care and lost wages resulting from
their injuries. The HSR regulations should be revised accordingly. 279
C. Working Conditions and Inspections
With substantial changes in order for subject compensation, next consider the
differential extent to which the HSR regulations and those governing the
workplace address day-to-day working conditions. At first glance, the difference
seems striking, with employees granted a variety of more specific protections.
But upon closer inspection, little regulatory change is needed for human subjects.
For obvious reasons, working conditions are of greatest concern to those
subjects enrolling in confinement studies at inpatient research centers. These sites
differ substantially with regard to quality of facilities, amenities, and staff,28 0 with
the worst facing problems described starkly by one self-titled "professional
guinea pig": "[o]vercrowding, no hot showers, sleeping in an easy chair,
incredibly cheap shit for dinner, creepy guys from New York jails-all these are
a poor man's worries . . . . Where are these things in the regulators'
paperwork?" 281
Although IRBs and HSR regulatory agencies have the authority to inspect
trial sites, such inspections are rare (largely due to resource constraints). When
they do occur, they tend to focus on things like recordkeeping, protocol
deviations, and informed consent issues.282 Paper-based review of research is the
firefighters/VFAWLawIntro.jsp (last visited Nov._22, 2013); see also James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., A
Hidden Epidemic: Assessing the Legal Environment Underlying Mental and Behavioral Health
Conditions in Emergencies, 4 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 33, 66 (2010); Rubinstein, supra
note 86, at 182 n.174.
279 In addition to a new provision in the HSR regulations mandating compensation for injury,
the prohibition on exculpatory language would also need to be modified in light of tort preemption.
Other legal changes may also be necessary as a result of the Anti-Deficiency Act and the Adequacy
of Appropriations Act. For a discussion of these issues, see Pike, supra note 212, at 47-49, 59.
280 See Elliott, supra note 30; GUINEA PIG ZERO, supra note 27, at 16-28; JiM HOGSHIRE, SELL
YOURSELF TO SCIENCE: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SELLING YOUR ORGANS, BODY FLUIDS, BODILY
FUNCTIONS AND BEING A HUMAN GUINEA PIG 9, 20-25 (1992); Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 9-10,
113-119.
281 Elliott, supra note 30 (quoting Robert Helms).
282 See FDA et al., Guidance for Industry: Oversight of Clinical Investigations - A Risk-
Based Approach to Monitoring, HHS 3 (Aug. 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/UCM269919.pdf ("Monitoring activities
include communication with the . . . study site staff; review of the study site's processes,
procedures, and records; and verification of the accuracy of data submitted to the sponsor.");
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norm, but most protocols contain little information on the physical aspects of the
sites where research is conducted, and IRB members may not be independently
283familiar with them. Investigators are charged by FDA with generally
protecting the rights, safety, and welfare of research subjects,284 but they have
substantial discretion with regard to site conditions, which are not explicitly
addressed by the HSR regulations. The same is true for study monitors selected
by sponsors to oversee the conduct and progress of clinical investigations at the
site level.285
In contrast, although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) also inspects a very small percentage of workplaces each year,2 86 its
regulations and overall focus are heavily concerned with specific conditions on
the ground.287 In fact, OSHA has a variety of requirements for the living quarters
at temporary labor camps,288 as well as housing for certain agricultural
workers. 289 Moreover, its general duty clause requires employers to provide a
place of employment "free from recognizable hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious harm to employees." This requirement would be
violated by an employer who does nothing to prevent or abate a recognized
hazard of workplace violence, such as threats, intimidation, or other indicators.290
Of course, trial sites are not as risky in and of themselves as mines, factories,
or other dangerous worksites, so similarly stringent inspection requirements
would seem overly burdensome. But is the difference between the OSHA and
HSR standards and regulations themselves problematic? Not really. First, to the
extent that sites are the workplaces of uncontroverted employees - research staff
- basic OSHA standards regarding things like means of egress, ventilation,
sanitation, and fire protection291 must already be satisfied, and research subjects
Bioresearch Monitoring (BIMO) Metrics - FY '10, FDA (2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/UCM26185
5.pdf, Daniel R. Levinson, The Food and Drug Administration's Oversight of Clinical Trials, HHS
(Sept. 2007), http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-06-00160.pdf; OHRP, OHRP's
Compliance Oversight Procedures for Evaluating Institutions, HHS (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/compliance/evaluation/ohrpcomp.pdf; ABADIE, supra note 27, at 155.
283 Elliott, supra note 30; Ondrusek, supra note 27, at 48-49, 113-119.
284 21 C.F.R. § 312.60 (2013).
285 21 C.F.R. § 312.53(d). Note that the Common Rule does not impose specific obligations
on sponsors or investigators, unlike the FDA regulations.
286 See Indicator 18: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Enforcement
Activities, MD. DEP'T. HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE,
http://phpa.dhmh.maryland.gov/OEHFP/EH/SitePages/Health-Indicator- 1 8.aspx (last visited Nov.
22, 2013) (finding that OSHA inspected only 1.2% of all establishments under its jurisdiction in
2000).
287 See generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910 (2013).
288 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142.
289 29 C.F.R. § 500.130.
290 Occupational Safety & Health Admin. (OSHA), Workplace Violence: Enforcement, U.S.
DEP'T LAB., http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/standards.htm) (last visited Nov. 22,
2013).




Fernandez Lynch: Human Research Subjects As Human Research Workers
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS As HUMAN RESEARCH WORKERS
would be incidental beneficiaries of compliance and enforcement. Second, the
health care facilities that may be used for research are heavily regulated,292 and
even if research is conducted at a stand-alone site not otherwise subject to
specialized health care facility regulations, the site will still be subject to local
building safety, sanitation, and fire codes. Indeed, it was violation of these
requirements that led to the 2005 demolition of a trial site in Miami.293 Thus, the
HSR regulations do not necessarily need to impose their own site-specific
standards, which may be redundant, nor should HSR regulators step in to enforce
standards that really ought to be enforced by other agencies.
Instead, the best approach to ensuring commensurate protection for workers
and human subjects is to make sure that the designated authorities appropriately
enforce the existing health and safety requirements applicable to research sites. It
may also be necessary to ensure that stand-alone research sites are covered by
appropriate health care facilities regulations, if they are not already. And it would
be a reasonable compromise for the HSR regulations to require that IRBs receive
certification or explicit assurance that facilities used for research purposes are in
compliance with all applicable facilities codes, as OSHA does in some
contexts.294 Finally, at an absolute minimum, the HSR regulations should make
clear that the responsibility for protecting subject welfare includes not only
consideration of study interventions but also study conditions, and should also
explicitly protect subjects against retaliatory action for reporting violations.295
Some site level issues will certainly remain, since there is no worklaw
requirement that supervisors be nice, that the food be good, or that entertainment
options be provided (all of which are complaints that have been lodged by the
subject community). However, these can be appropriately left to the market as
they are far removed from actual safety concerns, and instead reflect the sorts of
discomforts that are relatively commonplace in daily life.
D. Collective Bargaining and Unions
As a final point of comparison, consider that employees also have greater
protection than research subjects with regard to their rights to concerted action
and collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). At
292 See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59A-3.081 (2013) (Physical Plant Requirements for
General, Rehabilitation and Psychiatric Hospitals); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.133, Subch. 1 (2013)
(Hospital Licensing Physical Plant and Construction Requirements); JOINT COMMISSION, 2012
HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS (2011).
293 David Evans, Michael Smith, & Liz Willen, Big Pharma's Shameful Secret, BLOOMBERG
MARKETS, Dec. 2005 (describing study conditions at SFBC International's Miami site); David
Evans, SFBC Ordered to Demolish Miami Drug Test Center, BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2006, 4:10
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3FrIL6PPXkc (describing
conditions resulting in the site's demolition).
294 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 500.135 (2013).
295See, e.g., Safety and Health Standards: Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. DEP'T LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/compliance/guide/osha.htm (last updated Sept. 2009).
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first glance, it may appear that subjects are just as well protected via IRBs, if not
more so, given that IRBs stand as the constant intermediary protecting the
interests of subjects against those of researchers and sponsors. Further, although
researchers and sponsors have no choice but to engage with IRBs, IRBs are under
no obligation to "bargain" with those conducting the research; unlike bargaining
representatives under labor law, IRBs can command and compel because their
approval is legally required before research can proceed or continue.
It would be a mistake, however, to view IRBs as actually representing
subjects in the way that unions represent employees. With the exception of
research involving prisoners, the regulations do not require that any subjects be
included on the board, or that subjects be consulted at all, and no one is charged
with speaking on the subjects' behalf. 296 The goal is only to protect them, and a
mission to protect can be quite different from a mission to improve. Moreover,
even though a subject can always bring his or her concerns to the IRB, there is no
guarantee that the IRB's response will be what a subject had in mind; a complaint
about low payment is unlikely to result in higher rates if a board is concerned
about undue inducement, for example.
On the other hand, there is a growing trend toward community engagement
in HSR, with the goal of providing communities greater ownership of and
information about research projects. 297 Thus, a number of trial networks and
research sites now work with Community Advisory Boards (CABs) as a way to
provide those affected by or involved in research at the local level a way of
voicing their needs and concerns.29 8 Even this, however, is a far cry from the
protection offered to employees by the right to bargain collectively. First, the
community in question may include anyone bearing a stake in the research, from
government representatives to patient advocacy groups to health care workers to
subjects and their families. 29 9 Second, and more importantly, while it may be
good ethical practice to engage in community consultation, the regulations do not
296 45 C.F.R. § 46.107; 21 C.F.R. § 56.107 (describing IRB membership requirements). For
research involving prisoners, at least one member of the Board must be a prisoner or prisoner
representative. 45 C.F.R. § 46.305.
297 See, e.g., I NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH: CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 30 (2001); UNAIDS,
Good Participatory Practice: Guidelines for Biomedical HIV Prevention Trials (June 2011),
http://www.unaids.org/en/medialunaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2011/JC1853
GPPGuidelines_2011_en.pdf.
298 See, e.g., Cmty. Recommendations Working Grp., Recommendations for Community
Involvement in National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases HIV/AIDS Clinical Trials
Research, HIV VACCINE TRIALS NETWORK (Feb. 2009), http://www.hvtn.org/
community/CABRecommendationsCertified.pdf.
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require it outside the context of emergency research conducted without subject
consent. 300
Ultimately, there is no requirement that anyone actually hear and consider
the requests and demands of research subjects. If a subject attempted to negotiate
greater benefits for those enrolled in a trial, he would not be entitled to legal
protection against retaliation. 30 1 Even if he were not penalized, researchers and
sponsors would be under no obligation to negotiate with him or any other
representative, and even if they wanted to, any agreements reached could be
thwarted by the IRB. Then again, subjects would be under no obligation to
follow any standards whatsoever in their negotiations.
Employees covered by the NLRA, in contrast, have the "right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection... "302 Employers are prohibited from interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of these rights.3 03 The Act also protects both
employees and employers against certain behaviors by labor organizations.304
To engage in collective bargaining, employees must come together to
determine that they want a bargaining representative, and select one. If and once
they have done so, both the employer and the representative have a legal
obligation to bargain in good faith about wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment, 305 although this does not compel either party to agree to any
proposal made by the other.306 Moreover, employees may strike (and employers
may impose a lockout) in order to further their position, so long as they (or their
representatives) remain engaged in good faith bargaining throughout.307
Employees are also protected in their right to refrain from organizing,
joining a union, bargaining collectively, or engaging in other concerted
300 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(7)(i); FDA et al., Guidance for Institutional Review Boards, Clinical
Investigators, and Sponsors: Exception from Informed Consent Requirements for Emergency
Research, HHS 25-34 (Apr. 2013), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/
Guidances/UCM249673.pdf.
301 As one website offering tips for subjects advises: "Don't circulate petitions (or sign them)
protesting your pay, or restrictions on the unit .... Usually this behaviour will get you banned from
the clinic in the future." Tips for Clinical Trials and Clinical Study Volunteers, GPGP.NET (2009),
http://www.gpgp.net/tips.
302 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
303 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
304 29 U.S.C. § 158(b).
305 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d); Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act:
General Principles of Law Under the Statute and Procedures of the National Labor Relations
Board, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD. (NLRB) 20 (1997), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/224/basicguide.pdf.
306 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
307 Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 305, at 3-5, 16.
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activities. 308 However, because a bargaining representative need only be
designated by the majority of the employees in a bargaining unit, an individual
who would have selected a different representative or chosen not to engage in
collective bargaining at all is nonetheless stuck; all employees will be bound by
any collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the representative. 3 09 Another
restriction on the "right to refrain" is that although applicants for employment
cannot be required to be members of a union in order to be hired, and employees
cannot be required to join or maintain membership in a union in order to retain
their jobs, the NLRA does permit "union security" agreements in some cases.
Thus, a union and an employer can make an agreement that requires employees
to pay their share of "financial core" costs relating to the union's representational
activities (short of actual membership) in order to retain their jobs. 3 10 However,
in a "right-to-work" state, which now describes nearly half of the U.S.,
employees may not be forced to even financially support a union.3 1 1
All things considered, even though subjects may have some greater freedoms
than employees when it comes to negotiating, these are outweighed by the ability
of employees to come together to achieve things they likely could not on their
own, and to have a voice that must be heard by those in charge. 3 12 But should
subjects be leveled up with regard to collective bargaining and unionization, as
some bioethicists have argued?
The idea appears intuitively appealing, considering the similarities between
subjects and workers and the challenges they might face. For example, although
the stated function of the NLRA is to help mitigate industrial strife that would
otherwise burden or obstruct commerce if left unchecked, it also recognizes the
"inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract" and seeks to "restor[e]
equality of bargaining power between employers and employees" as a way to
protect commerce. 313 The fact that research subjects are not currently guaranteed
NLRA-type rights has clearly not brought commerce - or research - to a halt, so
it may seem unnecessary to institute any change in this regard. However, that
may be a testament to just how poor subjects' bargaining power truly is, rather
308 29 U.S.C. § 157.
309 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 305, at
8.
310 Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act, supra note 305, at 2.
311 Right to Work States, NAT'L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND.,
http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2013); "Right to Work" for Less, AFL-CIO,
http://www.aflcio.org/Legislation-and-Politics/State-Legislative-Battles/Ongoing-State-Legislative-
Attacks/Right-to-Work-for-Less (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
312 This is not to suggest that the NLRA rights are perfect or perfectly enforced, and in fact
many labor scholars have pointed out deficiencies and proposed solutions. See, e.g., Stephen F.
Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 433-443 (2002). However, the rights themselves are more than
what subjects have at present.
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than an indication that they are satisfied with the terms and conditions of the
research opportunities they are offered. With the exception of true altruists,
individual subjects generally hold the weakest position in the HSR relationship,
and their position could be improved by collective action on a large enough scale.
Thus, although the underlying purpose of the NLRA does not necessarily dictate
extension of similar rights to research subjects, it certainly does not conflict with
such extension.
Consider, however, the obstacles that would stand in the way of collective
bargaining and unionization by most research subjects. With some limited
exceptions,314 studies are usually developed and approved before any interaction
with subjects occurs, and before subjects are even identified, so there is not yet
anyone for those conducting the research to come together and bargain with, let
alone anyone whose interests can be represented, except in the abstract. Subjects
could decide to organize for improved terms and conditions once they have been
enrolled, at which point they have improved bargaining power together given the
sunken investment in their data, but by then, it is quite late to make any changes.
More importantly, outside of confinement studies, they may never be in the same
place at the same time or even know who else is in a study, which obviously
makes the identification of common interests and the push to organize difficult.
In addition, subjects may participate in research only once or just a few times,
such that even though they have shared interests, they have no long-term
investment in the hassle of organizing.315 Even if they could be assured
protection against retaliation for concerted action, in order for such action to
impose the desired bargaining pressure, the subjects would have to be willing to
take some risk together, e.g., to strike until their demands are met. Subjects who
just want the money or especially the potential therapeutic benefits may be
unwilling to do so. 3 16 Moreover, bargaining study-by-temporary-study would be
terribly inefficient. If organization and bargaining had to occur at this level, it is
very unlikely that the burdens would outweigh the benefits, and that enough
subjects would have adequate motivation to take the necessary steps.
Given their greater durability than single studies, the research site or sponsor
would seem to be the preferable locus of organizational activity, but that assumes
there are some subjects who have a site- or sponsor-level interest, beyond single
studies. That may be true for a subset of repeat and professional subjects,
although their numbers may be inadequate to provide significant leverage,
particularly given the difficulties they are likely to face identifying one another
314 For example, consider Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp.
2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003), where patients themselves initiated research on their rare disease and
would likely have had relatively strong bargaining power (had they attempted to reach a clear
agreement ex ante) by virtue of having something rare that researchers were interested in.
315 See Befort, supra note 94, at 170 (noting that many contingent workers do not see the
benefits of union representation in the context of short-term employment).
316 ABADIE, supra note 27, at 58; see also GALL, supra note 75, at 110-111 (explaining the
similar problem of organizing some commercial sex workers).
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317
and/or staying in contact once any given study is over. And even if they
successfully negotiate terms to cover all studies at a given site, for example, there
is the problem of free-riding, unless all subjects enrolling at that site are required
to contribute in some way to the negotiating group.
Subjects' best bet would be to "organize the industry" along the lines of the
Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and other performing arts unions, 3 18 but this too
would be tremendously challenging. Like subjects, actors are engaged in short-
term projects with a variety of different employers. To deal with these unique
circumstances, SAG negotiates basic contracts with producers to establish
minimum wages and working conditions for actors. 319 Producers who want to
hire SAG members must agree to the terms of a SAG contract, and actors who
want to perform in a "Guild Signatory production" must generally either be SAG
members or join within a certain period of time.320 Moreover, SAG members are
bound by "Global Rule One," which dictates that "no member shall work as a
performer or make an agreement to work as a performer for any producer who
has not executed a basic minimum agreement with the Guild which is in full
force and effect." 321 Failure to abide by this rule can lead to disciplinary action
including expulsion.
Ultimately, actors want to be SAG members because otherwise their job
prospects are limited and producers want to be Guild Signatories because
otherwise their talent prospects are limited. Note that for the system to work,
there must be a critical mass on at least one side of the equation: enough SAG
members refusing to work for non-SAG producers that the producers are strongly
motivated to deal, or enough SAG producers refusing to hire non-SAG members
(within the limits of union security agreements) that the actors are strongly
motivated to join. On the other hand, if enough producers refused to become
Guild Signatories, the actors could work without joining SAG - in fact, SAG
membership would hold them back because of Global Rule One - and if enough
317 Helms, supra note 5 ("The guinea pig workforce may be too fragmented and fluid to form
even an unofficial union."); ABADIE, supra note 27, at 82-83 (explaining that once a trial is over,
subjects usually do not remain in contact).
318 Others have also relied on the SAG model to demonstrate how diverse and nontraditional
workers who might be difficult to unionize could successfully do so. See, e.g., Patricia Ball,
Comment, The New Traditional Employment Relationship: An Examination of Proposed Legal and
Structural Reforms for Contingent Workers from the Perspectives of Involuntary Impermanent
Workers and Those Who Employ Them, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 901, 938 (2002).
319 Acting in Your Interest, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD (SAG) 15 (2011),
http://www.sag.org/files/sag/documents/ActingIn Your Interest 0.pdf.
320 Getting Started as an Actor FAQ: What Is a "Guild Signatory?", SAG-AFTRA,
http://www.sagaftra.org/content/getting-started-actor-faq (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). It is
important to recognize that this is a union security provision, however, and therefore is not
absolute. See Bob Labate, The Mystery of Financial Core, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Sept. 15,
200 0),http://www.hklaw.com/publications/The-Mystery-of-Financial-Core-09-15-2000/; Get the
Facts About Financial Core, SAG-AFTRA http://www.sagaftra.org/get-facts-about-financial-core
(last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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actors refrained from membership, producers would have no reason to become
Guild Signatories.
Putting this all together, in order for research subjects to engage in successful
collective action to negotiate better terms for study participation, they could wait
until a study is underway and then jointly threaten to quit - an unlikely scenario.
Or they could adopt the SAG model by forming a union and requiring members
to refuse to enroll in any study not covered by a union contract, which would
include union security provisions. However, if sponsors and sites are able to
enroll enough non-union subjects, they have no reason to sign a union contract,
and the whole thing falls apart. Thus, the essential element is encouraging the
critical mass of subjects to join. But is that possible?
Assuming that the right to refrain from union membership would be retained
in the realm of HSR, which undercuts unions but preserves important individual
freedoms, the most that could be required of subjects seeking enrollment in union
studies would be satisfaction of financial core obligations to the union, not actual
membership. 32 2 In that case, fee-paying nonmember subjects could participate in
union studies, as well as non-union studies because they would not be bound by
the requirement imposed on members to refuse enrollment in non-union work.
Moreover, in "right-to-work" states, even financial core status cannot be
required.3 23 Since this clearly allows free-riding on the union's efforts,324 there
are good arguments that it should not be allowed for HSR (or other types of
work). However, even though there is not necessarily any legal right to be
included in a research study, there might be a strong moral argument for treating
participation in at least therapeutic studies as a "right-to-work" endeavor, the
opportunity for which should not be denied on the basis of non-membership in a
subjects' union, or non-payment, as the case may be. 325 Indeed, research
participation may be a patient's best hope for care, particularly if they have
exhausted all other options and face a serious disease. Similarly, union
membership itself would be problematic if it would technically preclude
participation in a desirable, non-union therapeutic study through something like
Rule One. Subjects likely to enroll in only a single study or for whom the
therapeutic stakes are very high - namely, those for whom the worker analogy is
the weakest - would obviously choose enrollment over union membership in this
322 See Commc'ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988); N.L.R.B. v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
323 See Michael M. Oswalt, Note, The Grand Bargain: Revitalizing Labor through NLRA
Reform and Radical Workplace Relations, 57 DUKE L.J. 691, 700 (2007).
324 Id. at 701; see also Susan Guyett, Indiana Becomes 23rd "Right-to- Work" State, REUTERS
(Feb. 1, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-unions-indiana-
righttowork-idUSTRE81018920120201.
325 See, e.g., Martha L. Elks, The Right to Participate in Research Studies, 122 J.
LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 130 (1993) (arguing that it is important to protect subjects not only
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case. And subjects motivated purely by altruism - also in the weak analogy camp
- would likely see no need to come together for mutual protection in this way.
Ultimately, each of these factors would conspire to weaken any attempt at subject
unionism.
Repeat and professional subjects are the most likely candidates for successful
unionization, as they have the most "skin in the game" and are the most likely to
benefit from the entertainment industry approach. Given their concentration in
nontherapeutic, early phase studies, there seems to be no moral argument in favor
of a right-to-work approach, although as a scientific matter, limiting participation
in any type of research to union members (or those paying membership fees)
could be problematic in terms of generalizability and bias. Thus, it seems that
union security agreements would be unacceptable across the board in the
research context.
There are also a number of other barriers to achieving the critical mass of
subjects necessary to get any sites or sponsors to agree to collective bargaining
contracts. As noted above, subjects may be unwilling to refrain from enrollment
or participation as an exercise of power intended to push a deal through,
especially because there may be enough casual or one-time subjects available to
replace them. Moreover, if HSR regulations are amended to lift payment
restrictions and guarantee subjects a minimum wage, compensation for injury,
and decent working conditions, some of their chief complaints will have been
addressed, potentially cutting down on their motivation to organize.326 And
although the Internet could help,327 there is the fundamental problem of
organizing a group of relatively transient, potentially stigmatized subjects who
may fear running in opposition to a significant source of their income. 328 Perhaps
most importantly, if critical steps are taken to preserve the integrity,
generalizability, and validity of research results by limiting repeat
participation, 329 there will be even fewer subjects who would care enough to
organize.
So what is the bottom line for the HSR regulations - are the various obstacles
to collective action sufficient reason not to level subjects up? At the very least,
subjects should have the freedom to face these obstacles head on, and therefore
ought to have a protected right to engage in concerted activity, if they so choose,
just like workers protected by the NLRA.330 In the labor context, this right is
326 See ABADIE, supra note 27, at 58 (noting that subjects' pay is generally good compared to
other opportunities, so subjects have reduced incentive to challenge industry).
327 Richard B. Freeman & M. Marit Rehavi, Helping Workers Online and Offline:
Innovations in Union and Worker Organization Using the Internet, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13850, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl3850.
328 See GALL, supra note 75, at 92-93, 189-218 (describing a number ofbarriers to organizing
sex workers that apply with equal force to HSR).
329 See notes 187-190, supra, and accompanying text.
330 See Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional Labor Law: A
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quite broad, 33 1 as it should be for HSR. For example, sites and sponsors should be
prohibited from discriminating against a subject or potential subject in enrollment
or continued participation on the basis of that subject's present or former
attempts to advocate on behalf of subjects, draw attention to subjects' concerns,
inform subjects of their common interests and what they might be able to
accomplish working together, and organize subjects for collective activity.
Without these basic protections, subjects' bargaining power is limited to a degree
beyond their inherent financial and/or therapeutic vulnerability. Of course, these
concerted activities may fail to achieve subjects' goals, especially because
individual subjects should also be free to avoid joining in, and those conducting
the research would not be legally forced to give in to subjects' demands. But at
least by protecting the right to act together or call others to action, subjects would
have a good chance of being heard. Subjects aggrieved in their attempts to
exercise this right should have recourse to the IRB and/or federal regulatory
agencies overseeing HSR.332
The question of whether subjects ought to also be granted the right to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing is somewhat more
complicated, however. Unlike protecting concerted activity, which would involve
only the cost of enforcement, leveling up as to representative collective
bargaining would involve the administrative costs and practical considerations of
identifying appropriate bargaining units and conducting elections to determine
whether a majority of subjects wish to unionize, and if so, who they want to
represent them.333 Then again, these costs would only have to be incurred when
the subjects have some chance of success, as when they can demonstrate that
some threshold number supports representation, in which case the costs may be
justified.334 The alternative path of persuading a site or sponsor to voluntarily
recognize a subject bargaining representative after a showing of majority support
seems preferable,3 35 but of course, may be difficult to achieve without the
intervention of some third party.
Beyond the issue of resources, there may also be some concern that a
collective bargaining approach would create a situation in which those
conducting the research felt less responsibility for subject welfare, either because
subjects would be viewed as adversaries336 or because subjects have a better
means of protecting themselves. On the other hand, those conducting the research
331 Id. at 259-61.
332 Similarly, the NLRA offers no private right of action.
333 What We Do: Conduct Elections, NLRB https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-
elections (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
334 For example, before the NLRB will hold a representation election, at least 30% of
employees in the relevant bargaining unit must have signed a petition showing interest. Id.
335 Id.
336 GUINEA PIG ZERO, supra note 27, at 6 ("If we lab rats were to be taken under the regular
labor laws and tried using traditional organizing methods, we'd end up with fewer freedoms,
making less money, and we'd be lied to by the scientists more often.").
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would have to abide by the terms of any collective bargaining agreement, and at
a more fundamental level, the very reason collective bargaining would have been
necessary is that subjects felt others were not adequately protecting their
interests. 337
Ultimately, failure to grant subjects a right to representative collective
bargaining may not be a substantial problem in practice, since they are likely to
face so many obstacles to organizing in the first place, including the need to
adopt a right-to-work approach in the research setting for the reasons described
above. However, if they could successfully organize, this protection would be
essential to getting those who conduct research to engage in good faith
bargaining as a matter of course, rather than forcing subjects to threaten a strike
in order to even get sites and sponsors to the bargaining table. Many other types
of workers also face difficulty exercising their lab6r rights, and labor unions are
on the decline in general, 33 but this is not a reason to eliminate those rights or
not to offer them in the first place. If anything, it is a reason to seek ways to make
them more accessible. Further debate is in order, but for now, there appears to be
no compelling reason to refrain from leveling up by granting subjects the full
gamut of NLRA rights. 33 9 The best mechanism for doing so remains an open
question, 340 but the first step of protecting subjects' concerted activity should be
simple enough. And it is worth noting that large, public-minded funders of HSR
might be able to play a role here, for example requiring that grantees recognize
and engage with subject organizations who seek to negotiate, and perhaps even
helping to facilitate subject organizing where barriers are likely to stand in the
way of organic development. These funders could potentially set a new standard
for ethical research engagement, as they have in other areas.341
337 A related issue is whether there would be any role for IRBs if subjects could collectively
bargain. It is possible IRBs would still have an important function related to protecting community
interests in sound science and the like, but it is unnecessary to substantially delve into this issue
here given that collective bargaining is likely to occur so infrequently in the research setting.
338 GALL, supra note 75, at 225; Befort, supra note 312, at 361-77.
339 Note, however, that even in the standard employment context there is widespread
agreement that these rights are not adequately protected. See, e.g., Benjamin 1. Sachs, Employment
Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2685, 2694-2700 (2008).
340 See, e.g., Domestic Workers United et al., Domestic Workers and Collective Bargaining:
A Proposal for Immediate Inclusion of Domestic Workers in the New York State Labor Relations
Act, NAT'L DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE 12-13 (Oct. 2010),
http://www.domesticworkers.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/collectivebargaining.pdf (discussing
potential ways to allow domestic workers to engage in collective bargaining, including how
bargaining units could be defined, that may be of interest as an analogy to HSR).
341 See, e.g., Guidance for Addressing the Provision of Antiretroviral Treatment for Trial
Participants Following Their Completion of NIH-Funded HIV Antiretroviral Treatment Trials in
Developing Countries, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/antiretroviral/_(last
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Considering the divergent interests of research subjects and those conducting
the research, as well as issues of dependency and unequal bargaining power,
features that generally motivate a variety of worker protections, there was already
a strong case for leveling subjects up by revising the HSR regulations to
incorporate certain protections from worklaw. This section strengthened that case
in a number of areas by considering and rejecting possible reasons that worker
protections would be inappropriate for research subjects.
Thus, with a few caveats regarding the continued ability to conduct essential
research and certain inherent features of research injuries, the HSR regulations
should permit subjects to be paid without regard to an upper limit, require that
paid healthy subjects participating in nontherapeutic research be guaranteed some
minimum wage, mandate that injured subjects be compensated for medical care
and lost wages, extend consideration to site conditions, and protect subjects in
their concerted activities and efforts at representative collective bargaining.
Subjects need not be offered unemployment compensation, however, and ought
to be encouraged to pursue more viable alternatives to unionization, such as the
development of trade associations and other advocacy groups.
Where the regulations need revision, it clearly will not be appropriate to
simply cut-and-paste from the relevant provisions protecting workers. Tailoring
to account for the vagaries of HSR will be in order, but what has been established
here is that those bioethicists advocating for worker protections in relatively
abstract terms have been largely vindicated in the wake of rigorous legal and
normative analysis.
V. OUTSTANDING OBJECTIONS
Before concluding, there are a handful of outstanding objections worthy of
brief attention beyond those that have already been considered and dismissed
above. First, as recognized at a number of points in the preceding analysis,
worklaw as it currently exists is far from perfect - too many workers fall outside
the scope of protection, minimum wages are too low, workers' compensation
systems are flawed, union activity is not adequately supported, and US worklaws
do not apply to workers at foreign sites.342 Thus one may take issue with the use
of worklaw as the appropriate lodestar for human subjects research regulation. To
be clear, however, nothing herein is intended to suggest that if we just treat
subjects like workers, no further action will be needed. Again, the fundamental
point is recognizing the similarities between the two groups and the consistency
342 Zatz, supra note 81, at 58 n.3. On the question of international application, note that
unlike worklaw, the U.S. HSR regulations do not simply defer to local standards, but rather apply
equally whether research is conducted domestically or abroad (assuming the requisite jurisdictional
link to the U.S.). See Moral Science, supra note 17, at 31-32. Thus, if the regulations are amended
to add various worklaw protections as advocated herein, those protections would apply abroad as
well. In this sense, international subjects would be "leveled beyond" their workplace counterparts.
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in treatment that those similarities demand. Thus, if worker protections are
inadequate for workers, they ought to be improved, and for subjects as well. But
that fact is no reason not to extend the protections that do exist to subjects;
subpar protections are preferable to none at all.
A related objection suggests that even if subjects are like workers, they
should not be compared to workers in legally permissible industries but rather to
those engaged in illegal work, or work that is prohibited to be paid, such as
commercial sex work. Thus, the argument goes, even when it appears that
subjects are more protected than workers, they are in fact less protected than the
relevant comparators who are shielded by outright prohibition. The strongest
response to this objection is that many of those other transactions should not be
prohibited at all, but rather carefully regulated - just like HSR; indeed, a number
of serious and convincing arguments have been made in favor of legalized or
decriminalized prostitution, as well as permissible payment to organ "donors." 343
Moreover, the fact remains that we do allow subjects to be paid, and in that
context, paid work is the most apt analogy.
Even those who accept the relevance of the comparison to workers, however,
might be concerned that there is something fundamentally disrespectful about
recasting the human research subject as human research worker, perhaps moving
subjects from a special, revered category to the mundane ranks of the fast food
employee or factory worker, for example. But note that the extension of various
worker protections has been the result of the labor movement's attempts over
centuries to improve the worker's plight and garner respect for the worker as a
person rather than a widget. Thus, rather than treating the moniker "human
research worker" as a demotion, it might even be considered a compliment.
Finally, to be absolutely clear, nothing herein is intended to suggest that
repeat or professional research participation is a good thing. In most cases, it is
decidedly not. So while some have expressed worry that extending greater
protections to research subjects will make repeat participation more attractive,
that fear can and should be addressed by the sorts of limitations on repeat
participation discussed above, most importantly a subject registry. 3 Even in the
absence of a subject registry, however, it is important to recognize two things.
First, repeat participation already occurs, and trying to discourage it via
inadequate or inappropriate subject protections seems not only unfair, but callous
and misguided. Second, the additional protections would apply not only to those
subjects who consider research participation a job, but to all types of subjects,
healthy and sick, paid and unpaid, one-time players and repeat enrollers. Thus,
withholding protections to target one group of potential subjects is too blunt an
instrument, and would ultimately leave many other subjects who are not engaged
343 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, "Whetherfrom Reason or Prejudice": Taking Money for
Bodily Services, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 693 (1998).
344 It will also likely be necessary to take additional steps to make sure that adequate
enrollment can be achieved with these limitations, or to simply accept the consequence that some




Fernandez Lynch: Human Research Subjects As Human Research Workers
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS As HUMAN RESEARCH WORKERS
in worrisome enrollment without valuable protections - protections that may
make research participation itself more attractive to those who might otherwise
have been unwilling to participate at all.
CONCLUSION
We often use the term "work" without really considering what it means -
what should be included and excluded from its reach. There are areas of clear
agreement: the miner is working, the nurse is working, the bus driver, the
teacher, the firefighter. And there are areas of contention: stay-at-home parents,
prostitutes, reality TV stars - and research subjects. But instead of focusing on
whether a particular activity should be classified as work, a job, an occupation, a
profession, or something else, it is fruitful to ask a different question: why do we
extend certain legal protections to those who are engaged in work? And if those
reasons also apply to other activities, even when those activities seem to fall
outside the traditional boundaries of "work," why should they be treated any
differently? These are the questions that have driven this Article, and as a result,
it is hoped that even those who reject the idea of research participation as work
can see why certain worklaw protections ought to be extended to the research
context.
Unlike the bioethicists who initiated this debate, this Article clarifies that a
broad analogy between research subjects and workers does not actually suffice to
demonstrate that subjects should be granted additional legal protections, since not
all workers are protected by the law. And unlike the few legal decision-makers
who have considered the employment status of research subjects, this Article
goes beyond existing problematic legal distinctions to consider the ways in which
subjects are like those workers who should be protected by the law. Ultimately,
the HSR regulations should be revised such that all types of biomedical research
subjects are free to accept unrestricted payment for their participation, eligible for
a modified minimum wage, ensured no-fault compensation in the event of
research injury, and protected in their efforts at concerted activity.
In the end, human subjects research may not be as special as it appears at
first glance, nor the current regulatory scheme as protective as it might seem. The
worker analogy draws these features into sharp relief, and should be pursued
further, alongside other relevant comparisons, in order to develop the most
consistent and justifiable legal and ethical approach to the acceptable
involvement of human subjects in this socially important endeavor.
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